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Tort au canadien: A Proposal for
Canadian Tort Legislation on Gross
Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law
CarolineDavidson *
ABSTRACT

Despite Canada's strong rhetoric on the protection of
human rights, Canada lacks a meaningful tort scheme for gross
human rights violations akin to that of the United States. This
Article argues that legislation to facilitate tort suits for gross
violations of internationalhuman rights and humanitarianlaw
can be consistent with, and in fact supports, Canada's
commitments to human rights, the rule of law and
multilateralism. In particular, provincial tort legislation
should be one of a panoply of mechanisms in place to punish
and deter violations of internationalhumanitarianand human
rights law. This Article proposes the shape of the legislation
with respect to such key considerationsas jurisdiction,sovereign
immunity, and exhaustion. It contends that to comport with
Canada's strong backing for the international rule of law and
emphasis on multilaterism and internationalcooperation, this
"transnational" human rights legislation must be firmly
grounded in international law with respect not only to the
human rights norms covered but also to the jurisdictional
principles to be applied.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadians pride themselves
on their commitment to
internationalism and human rights. Canada is a member of almost
every international agency and organization. As one author has
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commented, "[N]o country belongs to more clubs."1 In addition,
Canada views itself as a champion of human rights. Canada's
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)
proclaims on its website:
A priority field of international concern and action for Canadians has
been and remains that of human rights. The Government regards
respect for human rights not only as a fundamental value, but also as a
crucial element in the development of stable, democratic and
2
prosperous societies at peace with each other.

Yet despite Canada's international inclinations and vociferous
support for human rights, Canadian courts are much more closed to
cases arising out of violations of international human rights law than
are the courts of its purportedly more isolationist and international
law-scoffing neighbor to the south.
This seeming contradiction has caused something of a stir in the
past year. Torture of Canadians abroad has garnered a great deal of
attention in the Canadian press. Canadian headlines have been filled
with reports of incidents of human rights violations: the torture and3
killing of an Iranian-Canadian journalist in Iranian custody in 2003,
the United States' rendition to Syria of a Syrian Canadian who was
then tortured for months, 4 Saudi Arabia's detention and torture of a

1.
ANDREW COHEN, WHILE CANADA SLEPT: How WE LOST OUR PLACE IN THE
WORLD 15 (2003).
DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE (DFAIT), CANADA IN THE WORLD:
2.
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 1995, PROJECTING CANADIAN VALUES AND CULTURE,
[hereinafter DFAIT
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign-policy/cnd-world/chap5-en.asp
Chapter 5].
See, e.g., Bruce Campion-Smith, Ottawa Demands New Kazemi Probe,
3.
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 18, 2004, at A12; Miro Cernetig, Accused Kazemi Killer Acquitted,
TORONTO STAR, July 25, 2004, at Al.
4.
Arar was arrested as he passed through JFK airport on the way home from
a family vacation. See e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights, John Ashcroft Sued by
http://www.ccrSued],
Ashcroft
John
[hereinafter
Torture
for
CCR
ny.org/v2/print-page.asp?ObjID=vRQgEt97ZX&Content=318. He ended up in Syria
after U.S. officials deemed him an Al Qaeda suspect and decided to "outsource" their
interrogation of him to Syria, knowing full well that Syria was likely to torture him.
See id. Syria complied and, after weeks of torturing Arar, exacted a confession from
him of involvement in Al Qaeda. Eventually realizing that the confession was false
and that they had nothing on Arar, and after a significant lobbying by Arar's wife back
in Canada, the Syrians released him and he returned to Canada. The Canadian
government has launched an inquiry into the Canadian government's involvement in
the affair. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Canadian Government to Conduct
Inquiry into Treatment of CCR Torture Client Maher Arar, http://ccr-nyorg/v2
/print-page.asp?ObjID=AJ48mobzZl& Content=322. Arar has sued Attorney General
John Ashcroft and other U.S. officials in the Eastern District of New York for sending
him to be tortured in Syria. See supra John Ashcroft Sued. Arar based his suit on the
Torture Victim Protection Act, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
treaty law. Complaint at 3, Arar v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2410405 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (No.
1:04-CV-00249). Arar has sued the Canadian government in Canadian courts for $400
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Canadian for thirty-one months 5 and others. Canadians have also
been in the news as perpetrators of human rights violations. A
Canadian oil company, Talisman, has come under fire for its role in
human rights violations in the Sudan. 6 In the not so distant past,
Canadian soldiers were also the alleged perpetrators of gross
violations of human rights, particularly the torture of Shidane Arone

7
in the Canadian military compound in Somalia.
Should these victims try to file suit in Canadian courts, they are
Canadian law does not make
likely to encounter some hurdles.
bringing tort suits based on gross human rights violations easy.
Canada has no equivalent to the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
or Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),8 which provide jurisdiction
for violations of the "law of nations" and a cause of action for torture,

9

respectively.

A recent case illustrates the difficulty of tort suits based on
human rights violations in Canada. Houshang Bouzari, a prominent
Iranian businessman and Canadian citizen, was jailed and tortured
in Iran for eight months. Bouzari then sued Iran in an Ontario trial
court for torture. 10 To the dismay of the human rights community in
Canada, the case was dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity."

million. Kim Lunman, Arar Suing Canada Over U.S. Deportation,The Globe and Mail,
Apr. 23, 2004, at A8. Mr. Arar alleges that CSIS, the RCMP and the Canada Border
Services Agency targeted him "on the basis of racial and cultural stereotypes and
prejudices." Id.
5.
Bill Sampson, a Canadian held and tortured in Saudi prison for 31 months
sued his torturers and Saudi Arabia in a court in the United Kingdom. Saudi Arabia v.
Ministry of the Interior, [2005] W.B. 699, available at 2004 WL 2387139; see Kevin
Ward, Sampson Can Sue Captors; Canadian Beaten in Saudi Jail Wins Key Legal
Victory British Court Backs Bid to Seek Redress from Torturers, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
29, 2004, at A26.
6.

See JEMERA RONE, SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2003), available at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudanll03/. A class action complaint was filed
against Talisman and the Republic of Sudan in the Southern District of New York for
extrajudicial killing (including murder and summary execution), forced
displacement, military bombings and assaults on civilian targets, confiscation
and destruction of property, kidnappings, rape and slavery, relating to or
arising from the oil exploration and extraction activities of Defendants
Talisman Energy, Inc.... and the Republic of Sudan ....
1, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Amended Class Action Complaint
Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01 CB 9882), available at 2002
WL 32768900.
See CRAIG ScoTT, TORTURE As TORT 33-35 (2001).
7.
8.

INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 846

(Hugh M. Kindred et al. eds., 6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
9.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28
(2004).

10.
11.

Larry Krotz, Houshang'sPromise, THE WALRUS, Sept. 2004, at 6.
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2004] D.L.R. 406.
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Alternative human rights enforcement mechanisms in Canada
are likewise inadequate. To comply with its obligations as a state
party of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Canada passed
domestic implementing legislation: the Crimes against Humanity and
War Crimes Act (CAHWCA). 12 CAHWCA provides that genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are indictable offenses
under Canadian law, whether committed inside or outside of
Canada. 13 CAHWCA "asserts universal jurisdiction, allowing Canada
to prosecute anyone (regardless of nationality) present in Canada for
the crimes listed in the CAHWCA."'14 So far, no cases have been
brought under the CAHWCA. 15
Prior to CAHWCA, Canada unsuccessfully attempted to
criminally prosecute and deport Canadian citizens found guilty of war
crimes in Nazi-occupied Europe.16 Canada amended its criminal code
to allow extraterritorial jurisdiction for prosecution of war crimes or
crimes against humanity if the accused is a Canadian citizen, if the
accused is a citizen of a country at war with Canada, or if the victim
17
is a Canadian citizen or a citizen of one of Canada's allies. In 1994,
in the first case to come before it under the amendment, the Supreme
Court acquitted the defendant, Imre Finta, who was accused of war
crimes and crimes against humanity against Hungarian Jews during
World War 11.18 By January 1995, the Canadian government had
announced a shift in its approach for dealing with individuals accused
of war crimes and crimes against humanity who were present in
Canada. 19 This shift stemmed in part from the perception that the
Finta case established a burden of proof that was impossible to
meet.2 0 The government announced a new policy, whereby it "would

Crimes Against Humanity & War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24; see DFAIT,
12.
Canada and the International Criminal Court, http:llwww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignpolicy/icc/canada_ icc-en.asp (describing Canada's role in the ICC's creation and stating
that, "Canadians can be proud of Canada's role at the forefront of the effort to establish
the International Criminal Court").
Crimes Against Humanity & War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24, §§ 4(1),
13.
6(1) (Can.), available at http:/Ilaws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-45.9/index.html.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada
14.
and the International Criminal Court: Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign-policy/icc/crimes-en.asp.
Adrian Humphreys, Ottawa Targets 86 War Thugs, NATIONAL POST, May 5,
15.
2004, at Al.
Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement
16.
of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgements Convention,
42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 141, 148 (2001); see COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON WAR CRIMINALS,
REPORT PART I: PUBLIC (1986) (discussing prosecuting war criminals in Canada).
Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 148.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.; see also Judith Hippler Bello & Irwin Cotler, InternationalDecision, 90
20.
AM. J. INT'L L. 456, 467-73 (1996) (discussing the Regina v. Finta decision).
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respond with administrative actions seeking the denaturalization,
revocation of citizenship, and/or deportation of offenders" in lieu of
21

prosecution.
Unfortunately, immigration law is a blunt tool for holding
human rights violators accountable for their transgressions and for
providing victims with a legal voice. The government has allowed a
great number of violator-deportees to escape. 22 In addition, as in
criminal cases, victims play no role in directing the government's

immigration and deportation proceedings

against human rights

violators.
International mechanisms are similarly limited: most afford an
individual victim no means by which to bring a case. As one scholar
has explained,
[i]nstitutions based on the U.N. Charter, international multilateral
treaties, or regional agreements typically address state responsibility
and norm compliance but do not assign liability to individual
defendants, generate enforceable remedies, or provide victims with a
23
judicial forum in which to bear witness and confront their abusers.

Ad hoc criminal tribunals are plagued by budgetary concerns and can
process relatively few claims. 24 The ICC lacks money (and,
25
notoriously, U.S. support) and has very limited jurisdiction.
This Article argues that Canada should enact legislation that
provides universal jurisdiction for tort suits involving gross violations
of international human rights law, akin to the U.S.'s TVPA. This
Article gives an overview of the shape the legislation should take.
Part II discusses the U.S.'s ATCA, 26 the TVPA, and the emerging
field of transnational public law litigation. Part III examines whether
such legislation would be appropriate and feasible in Canada and
concludes that it is. Provincial tort legislation should be one of a
panoply of mechanisms to punish and deter violations of

21.
Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 148.
22.
Canada Draws a Hard Line on Deporting War Criminals, NATIONAL POST,
May 5, 2004, at A8.
23.
Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 161.
24.
Patricia McGowan Wald, Former Judge International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Testimony at Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives, Hearing on U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
International Justice or Show of Justice, at 3, 6, Feb. 28, 2002; see also Ralph Zacklin,
The Failings of Adhoc International Criminal Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541,
545 (2004).
25.
See Larry Krotz, Reasonable Doubts: The InternationalCriminal Court Gets
Cross-Examined, THE WALRUS, Nov.-Dec. 2003; The United States and the
International Criminal Court, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm.
26.
The choice of ATCA versus Alien Tort Statute is a loaded one. Proponents
of the statute as a tool for human rights plaintiffs tend to choose the former; whereas
opponents of this use tend to choose the latter. In Sosa, the Supreme Court chose the
Alien Tort Statute. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
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humanitarian and human rights law. Part IV proposes the shape of
the legislation with respect to such key considerations as jurisdiction,
sovereign immunity, and exhaustion. Such legislation should be
firmly grounded in international law with respect to both human
rights and jurisdictional norms. This "transnational" legislation is
consistent with Canada's various identities as protector of human
rights, rule-abiding international player, and proponent of
multilateral solutions to international problems.

II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS TORT LEGISLATION AND CASE
LAW
A. ATCA
The United States has been the host to a variety of tort suits for
human rights abuses since the 1980s. The ATCA, which provides that
federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States," 27 has played a central role
in these human rights suits. For roughly two hundred years, "the
statute was largely ignored, rarely cited, and relied upon in only two
cases."28 The history and intended purpose of the statute are hotly
debated. 29 As one judge put it, "[t]his old but little used section is a
kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first
30
Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know whence it came."
In 1980, some creative human rights lawyers invoked the longforgotten statute in a suit against Paraguayan military officials for
torture. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit held that
relatives of a young man tortured and killed in Paraguay by a
Paraguayan police officer could obtain damages under the ATCA
because the acts violated international law. 31 The Second Circuit's
decision in Filartiga "established that this statute confers federal
subject-matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions are
satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
27.
28.
Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2002).
29.
See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Content, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 701 (2002); William S. Dodge,
The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists,"19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 239 (1996).
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
30.
31.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the law of nations (i.e., international law). '32 Or, as one scholar
stated, "[t]he decision has been read to stand for a breathtakingly
simple proposition: that a foreigner, merely by alleging a violation of
the law of nations, is entitled to sue in the courts of the United
33
States."
Indeed, the ATCA is a vague and broad statute. The statute
"does not specify the defendants who can be sued, the nature of the
claims, or the limitations on such claims. Courts must look to
34
customary international law and other common law principles."
Citing cases based on allegations of economic wrongs and conduct of
non-government officials, one scholar argues that "the breadth of
many of these claims make it difficult to ascertain the boundaries, if
any, encompassed within the idea of human rights or 'the law of
35
nations."'
Recently, human rights lawyers have begun using the ATCA to
sue corporations as well as individuals. Perhaps the most famous
example of this appeared in Doe v. Unocal, where plaintiffs sued
Unocal for
(1) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"); (2) forced labor; (3) crimes
against humanity; (4) torture; (5) violence against
women; (6) arbitrary arrest and detention; (7) cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; (8) wrongful death; (9)
battery; (10) false imprisonment; (11) assault; (12)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (13) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (14) negligence per se;
(15) conversion; (16) negligent hiring; (17) negligent
supervision; (18) violation of California Business &
Professions Code § 17200.36

32.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Thomas E.
Vanderbloemen, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed Hague Jurisdictionand
Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the United States, 50 DUKE L.J.
917, 926 (2000) (quoting Kadic's formulation of subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATCA).
33.
M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary InternationalLaw Through Municipal
Adjudication:A StructuralInquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1080 (1999).
34.
CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
LITIGATION 457, 472 (2001).

THE

COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

35.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1141-42.
36.
Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2001). A panel of the Ninth
Circuit held that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged violations of the law of nations
under the ATCA, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2002), but the
Ninth Circuit has ordered that the case be reheard en banc, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 978, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2003). The parties ultimately settled the case out of court.
See Docket: Doe v. Unocal, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2flegal/corporate-accountability/
corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=lrRSFKnmmm&Content=45.
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In Unocal, the U.S. Department of Justice argued that the ATCA
provided no private cause of action, but rather was only a
jurisdictional statute, and that the ATCA had no extraterritorial
before the U.S. Supreme
application. 37 It made the same argument
38
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
The ATCA has survived a sustained challenge from the Bush
administration, 39 which culminated in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.40 The case stemmed from an
incident in 1985, in which a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, "was captured on
assignment in Mexico and taken to a house in Guadalajara, where he
was tortured over the course of a two-day interrogation, then
murdered. '4 1 DEA officials in the United States believed that
Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican physician, was
involved in the torture. In 1990, Alvarez was indicted for the torture
and murder of Camarena. 42 The U.S. District Court for the Central
43
After
District of California issued a warrant for his arrest.
negotiations with the Mexican government for the handover of
Alvarez proved fruitless, the DEA hired Mexican nationals to capture
Alvarez and bring him to the United States for trial. Pursuant to the
plan, a group of Mexicans "abducted Alvarez from his house, held him
overnight in a motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso,
Texas," where federal officers arrested him. 4 4 Arguing that his
seizure was "outrageous government conduct" and violated the
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, Alvarez
moved to dismiss the indictment against him. 45 The district court
Court
agreed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the 4Supreme
7
reversed. 46 Alvarez was tried in 1992 and acquitted.

Brief for the United States of America [as Amici Curiae Supporting Unocal
37.
Corp.], Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 5-12, 27-29 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-566003
& 0056628).
See Transcript of Oral Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, Mar. 30,
38.
2004. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485) [hereinafter
Transcript of Oral Argument] (discussing whether the ATCA is a jurisdictional
statute).
See Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
39.
Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169,
169 (2004).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
40.
Id. at 697.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 698.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
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In 1993, upon returning to Mexico, Alvarez filed a civil suit
against Sosa, Antonio Garate-Bustamente-a Mexican citizen and
DEA operative-five unnamed Mexican civilians, the United States,
and four DEA agents. 48 Relying on the ATCA, Alvarez sought
damages from Sosa for a violation of the "law of nations. ''4 9 The
district court awarded $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on his ATCA
claim. 50 A three-judge panel and an en banc court of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision on the ATCA. 51 The Supreme Court granted
52
certiorari, among other things, to clarify the scope of the statute. It
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, but left the ATCA largely
53
intact.
In Sosa, the U.S. Department of Justice and the other
defendants argued that the ATCA did not provide a cause of action.
Rather, they argued it was merely a jurisdictional statute. 54 Alvarez,
by contrast, argued that the statute was "authority for the creation of
a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law. '55 The
Supreme Court found Alvarez's reading "implausible" 56 and held that
the ATCA is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of
action. Nevertheless, it held that "the reasonable inference from the
historical materials is that the statute was intended to have practical
effect the moment it became law. '5 7 The Court concluded: "The
jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action
for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
58
for personal liability at the time.
Much to Justice Scalia's dismay, 59 the ensuing discussion left the
door open for the recognition of torts stemming from customary
international law because the Court qualified its holding by saying:

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 38.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Justice Scalia noted that,

[i]n
holding open the possibility that judges may create rights where Congress
has not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances judicial occupation of
a domain that belongs to the people's representatives. One does not need a
crystal ball to predict that this occupation will not be long in coming, since the
Court endorses the reasoning of "many of the courts and judges who faced the
issue before it reached this Court," including the Second and Ninth Circuits.
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We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress
understood that the district courts would recognize private causes of
action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations, though we
have found no basis to suspect that Congress had any examples in mind
beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone's three primary
offences: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too, that no development in the
two centuries from the enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern
line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd
Cir. 1980) has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress
has not in any relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common
60
law power by another statute.

The absence of a categorical preclusion suggests that U.S. courts may
continue to recognize torts in violation of the "law of nations."
The Supreme Court, however, urged caution in recognizing torts
under the "law of nations." It held that federal courts must "require
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the eighteenth61
The Court deemed this
century paradigms we have recognized.
requirement to be "fatal to Alvarez's claim."62
The U.S. Supreme Court listed a "series of reasons" for judicial
caution in the consideration of individual claims, 63 some of which
would likely be of interest to Canadian legislators. For example, it
cited the foreign relations implications of private causes of action.
The Court explained:
[The subject of those collateral consequences is itself a reason for a
high bar to new private causes of action for violating international law,
for the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United
States of recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary
of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
64
Branches in managing foreign affairs.

Further, the Court encouraged restraint because courts have "no
congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable

Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60.
Id. at 724-25.
61.
Id. at 725. Framed in the negative, the Court held that, "[flederal courts
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted." Id. at 732.
Id. at 725. The Court deemed the tort of "arbitrary detention" that is not
62.
prolonged not to meet this standard. It concluded, "[wihatever may be said for the
broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an
aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require."
Id. at 738.
63.
Id. at 725-28.
64.
Id. at 727.
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violations of the law of nations, and modern indications
congressional understanding of the judicial role in the filed have
affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity. ' 65 It read
TVPA to be confined to the subject matter of torture. Much like
Bouzari court in Ontario, the Sosa court shied away from pushing
bounds of international law absent an explicit mandate from
legislature.

of
not
the
the
the
the

B. TVPA
In 1992, the U.S. Congress enacted the TVPA, which codified the
holding in Filartiga and extended it to U.S. citizens. 66 The TVPA
provides a civil remedy against anyone who has subjected an
individual to torture or extrajudicial killing:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
68
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.

The TVPA requires a plaintiff to exhaust adequate and available local
remedies and imposes a ten-year statute of limitations. 69 It also
defines the terms "extrajudicial killing" and "torture."70 Unlike the
ATCA, which clearly provides jurisdiction, but (at least until Sosa)
was ambiguous as to whether it provided a cause of action, the TVPA
creates a cause of action, but does not provide jurisdiction. 7 1 The
TVPA permits an appellant to ground his or her torture claim

Id. at 728.
65.
See Brief of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Organizations
66.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01 Civ. 9882) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 102-367, pt. 1 (1991)) ("The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern
basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law,
section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 ....").Both the House and the Senate reports
cited Filartiga with approval and affirmed the ATCA's importance and viability. Id.
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1 (1991) and S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991)); Goodman &

Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 514 (1997).
68.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(a)(1)-(2)
(2005).
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
69.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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jurisdictionally in either the ATCA or the general federal question
jurisdiction of § 1331.72
Although the TVPA is clearer in most respects than the ATCA,
the TVPA presents a new complication because of a tension between
its state actor requirement-based on that of the underlying
Convention Against Torture (CAT) 73-and sovereign immunity. 74 The
TVPA only applies to those acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." 75 The tension arises
because, absent some controlling exception, U.S. courts have held
that sovereign immunity bars suits against states under the ATCA
the sovereign
and the TVPA. 76 Plaintiffs have circumvented
immunity bar in suits against officials by arguing that the individual
is acting "in an official capacity" for the purposes of legal liability but
not for the purpose of immunity. 77 If plaintiffs sue under the TVPA,

72.
Id.
73.
The CAT likewise makes state participation an element of torture. It
defines torture as,
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 39/46, U.N. Doc. A1RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (emphasis added).
74.
See, e.g., David Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign
Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255
(1996); see also Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 237-38.
75.
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)(1)-(2) (1992).
Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989);
76.
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the argument that there was an implied waiver of sovereign immunity in
cases ofjus cogens violations); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that there was no exception to sovereign
immunity for acts of torture committed outside the UNITED STATES); Beth Stephens,
Conceptualizing Violence Under InternationalCriminal Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the
Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 579, 598 (1997) ("Litigation under the ATCA and the TVPA
has not been successful against sovereign states, which are protected from suits in U.S.
courts by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), unless the claim falls within
one of the enumerated exceptions to immunity," and these "do not include a general
authorization for claims of gross human rights abuses."). But see Princz, 26 F.3d at
1179-85 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing for implied waiver of FSIA in cases of jus
cogens violations).
77.
See Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.
1990); see also Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1332 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that
people with command responsibility may be sued under TVPA in their official
capacity).
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however, they must be careful to show that the torturer was
nevertheless a state actor for the purposes of the TVPA.
Despite Canadian courts' apparent scepticism about the notion
that suing a state official is different than suing the state, the state
actor should not be immune from suits for torture under Canadian
law. The Ontario Court of Appeal, for example, has held that suing an
individual is essentially the same as suing the state because the
The difference
money ultimately comes from the same place. 78
between U.S. and Canadian law on this point is perhaps overstated.
In the United States too, "[i]t is generally recognized that a suit
against an individual acting in his official capacity is the practical
equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly. '79 Lord Mance's
interpretation of the state actor language in the CAT in the Court of
Appeal in the United Kingdom is instructive. Lord Mance reasoned
that:
[t]he requirement that pain or suffering be inflicted by a public official
does no more in my view than identify the author and the public
context in which the author must be acting. It does not lend to the acts
of torture themselves any official function to inflict, or that an official
can be regarded as representing the state in inflicting, such pain or
80
suffering.

Moreover, Lord Mance squarely addressed the concerns of the
Ontario Supreme Court in Jaffe that the money for any judgment
would come out of the same pockets. Lord Mance explained that if
"torture by one of [a state's] officials was confirmed it [the state]
would presumably disown the official's conduct. There is no basis on
which the state could be made liable to indemnify one of its officials
's
provided to have committed systematic torture."'
C. TransnationalLitigation
Tort suits under the ATCA and the TVPA are prime examples of
an emerging field of law that has been dubbed "transnational public
law litigation. 8 2 Transnational public law litigation breaks down the
traditional division between international litigation (between states)
and domestic litigation (between private individuals).8 3 Traditionally,
in domestic litigation, "private individuals bring private claims

78.
Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] D.L.R. 315.
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
79.
Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, 148 S.J.L.B. 1286 (C.A. 2004).
80.
81.
Id.
77.
Harold Hogju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
82.
2347, 2348 (1991).
83.
Id.; see also Craig Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort, in
SCOTT, supra note 7, at 49-50.
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against one another based on national law before competent domestic
judicial fora, seeking both enunciation of norms and damages relief in
the form of a retrospective judgment." 84 By contrast, in international
litigation, "nation-states bring public claims against one another
based on treaty or customary international law before international
tribunals of limited competence."8 5 The main goal of this
international litigation was "usually the enunciation of a public
international norm that will stimulate 'relief in the form of a
negotiated political settlement." 86
In the emerging field of transnational public law litigation,
however, a new model has emerged:
Private individuals, government officials, and nations sue one another
directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most
prominently, domestic courts. In these fora, these actors invoke claims
of right based not solely on domestic or international law, but rather, on
87
a body of "transnational" law that blends the two.

For example, the ATCA does not explicitly name a particular type of
conduct, such as murder, that gives rise to the cause of action, but
rather requires courts to interpret the "law of nations" or customary
international law. 88 Thus, a U.S. court dealing with an ATCA case
must examine U.S. and other national domestic laws regarding issues
such as service, jurisdiction, conflict of laws, forum non conveniens,
and customary international norms, in determining whether the "law
of nations" has been violated.
Although Canada lacks ATCA- or TVPA-style legislation,
Canadian courts have been carving out a space for "transnational
law" on their own initiative. A prime example of this trend is the use
of international law as a tool of statutory interpretation, even when it
89
has not been explicitly enacted with implementing legislation. The
Canadian Supreme Court has held that whether or not international

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Koh, supranote 82, at 2348-49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In Canada, as

[iun [other] common law countries which have inherited the UK's Westminster
conception of government, . . . there exists by and large a radical formal
separation between international treaty law and its implementation by
domestic courts, such that a treaty norm does not have the direct force of law
but rather must be given effect by legislation; even if a statue in such a country
specifically and verbatim provides for an entire treaty to be applied by its
courts or designated tribunals, it is still the case, in formal terms, that those
institutions are applying national (statute) law and not international (treaty)
law.
Scott, supranote 83, at 49.

1418

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.1403

norms have been adopted into Canadian law through implementing
legislation, "they are relevant sources for interpreting rights
domestically."90 It has explained that "the legislature is presumed to
respect the values and principles enshrined in international law, both
customary and conventional. These constitute a part of the legal
context in which legislation is enacted and read. In so far as possible,
therefore, interpretations that reflect these values and principles are
preferred." 91
Enacting tort legislation for gross violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law norms would signal legislative
approval of this transnational law ethos already existing in Canadian
judges, particularly in the context of human rights. By taking on tort
cases for violations of international law, Canada also puts itself in a
and, relatedly, customary
position to shape transnational
international law, which is defined in part by the practice and
92
decisions of states.

III. LOOKING SOUTH: SHOULD CANADIANS HAVE ATCA- AND TVPASTYLE LEGISLATION?

A. Canadaas Human Rights Champion and Good International
Citizen
Canada sees itself as an upstanding player in the international
system and a champion of human rights. Although at first glance
these priorities seem to go hand in hand-a good international player
abides by international law, and a protector of human rights follows
international human rights law-the situation is significantly more
complex. Aggressive enforcement of human rights norms via farreaching jurisdictional principles requires stretching international
law, sometimes in ways that much of the international community
finds uncomfortable. Yet, in Canada, we want to have our cake and
eat it too.

90.
Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; see Reference re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
91.
R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 S.C.C. 2 (quoting R. SULLIVAN,
DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 330 (3d ed. 1994)).

Arguably, Canada has attempted to do this in its sovereign immunity
92.
statute. The editors of one Canadian treatise on international law note that
Parliament's passing of the SIA "is singularly remarkable for attempting to legislate
customary international law." Arguably, the provincial parliaments should do the same
with an ATCA.
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1. Canada as Multilateralist and Proponent of International Law
Multilateralism and international cooperation based on the rule
of law are central to Canadian foreign policy. As one commentator
has put it, "[w]e've made multilateralism into almost a secular
According to Alan
religion. It defines our foreign policy.193
Fletcher School of
at
the
history
diplomatic
of
Henrikson, professor
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, "Canada has traditionally
94
been in more multilateral organizations than any other country."
Following a recent project to canvass the opinions of Canadians on
foreign policy, the government concluded that "[o]ne of the most
consistent themes ...

is that despite the problems highlighted by the

Iraq crisis, multilateral cooperation based on international law must
remain a foundation of Canadian foreign policy." 95
DFAIT clearly places a lot of stock in the concept of "rule of law":
The rule of law is the essence of civilized behaviour both within and
among nations. Clearly defined rules allow us to plan commitments and
activities with reasonable certainty that our expectations about the
surrounding environment will not be upset by arbitrary and erratic
changes. Perhaps even more importantly, agreed rules help to diminish
the capacity of those with the greatest raw influence to bend societyand the international community-to their own ends. Rule-making
helps to redress power imbalances. Canada will remain in the forefront
96
of those countries working to expand the rule of law internationally.

Thus, the rule of law in itself is viewed as a way of curbing abuses,
such as human rights violations.
One needs look little further than the detention facility at
Guantanamo and the invasion of Iraq to conclude that the United
States is less wedded to the idea of multilateralism. 9 7 Ironically, the
maverick U.S. position in the international order is in many ways
philosophically consistent with its sweeping tort legislation. Although
embraced by human rights groups, the U.S.'s aggressive tort
legislation, which reaches violators of international law who may
have no connection to the country, serves as an example of U.S.
exceptionalism and even scorn for the international community.

Richard Gwyn, Multilateralism has limits, GUELPH MERCURY, Apr. 28,
93.
2003, at A7. For a critique of Canada's unprincipled commitment to multilateralism,
see Frank Harvey, Principles? What Principles?,NATIONAL POST, Apr. 16, 2003, at A19.
Bob Deans, G-8 Backgrounder: Canada: Major Player, New Leader
94.
Neighbor has BorderIssues, Security Among Key Concerns, ATLANTA J.- CONST., May 2,
2004, at C5.
DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, A DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN
95.
POLICY: REPORT TO CANADIANS 12 (2003), http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/pdf

/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter A Dialogue on Foreign Policy].
DFAIT Chapter 5, supra note 2.
96.
97.
See Harry Sterling, Sometimes 'Quiet Diplomacy' Just Isn't Effective,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 14, 2003, at A25.
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Arguably, using Canadian courts to condemn people in other
states or, depending on the status of sovereign immunity, other states
themselves,
would compromise
Canada's multilaterist
and
international law-abiding stances. Indeed, both the government
lawyers and the Bouzari lower court seemed to wrestle with this
tension. A federal lawyer who represented the Canadian government
in the Bouzari case told the Canadian press that "while Canada is
opposed to torture, it also believes treaties to prevent such things as
human rights abuses depend on international cooperation, which
could be in jeopardy if Canada assumed legal jurisdiction over foreign
governments."9 8 Similarly, in rejecting Bouzari's arguments that the
State Immunity Act (SIA) should be interpreted to allow the suit for
torture against Iran to proceed, the court noted that "even more
important than the problem which the plaintiff faces with the
language of the Act is the fact that the legislation in its current form,
without further exception, is consistent with both customary
international law respecting state immunity and Canada's treaty
obligations." 99
2. Canada as Human Rights Champion
Canada also views itself as a champion of global human rights
and talks a big game on international justice and human rights.
Irwin Cotler, the Minister of Justice, has emphasized that human
rights are a priority for the country: "Canada has a reputation worldwide for being a leader in ensuring that there is no safe haven for
individuals involved in crimes against humanity or war crimes,
regardless of when or where these crimes took place." 10O This
leadership role appears to encompass judicial efforts to ensure
accountability. According to Cotler, "We want to take a leadership
role in engaging the international community to work even more
closely with us to bring the perpetrators to justice." lo International

98.
2, 2004, at
99.
100.
101.

Tracey Tyler, Victims Fight Law Shielding Torturers,TORONTO STAR, Oct.
A22.
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2004] D.L.R. 406.
Humphreys, supra note 15.
Id. Cotler said at a 2002 conference in Sweden,

[tlhe presence of war criminals among the world's democracies, including
Canada... is
a
moral
and juridical
obscenity,
an
affront
to
conscience .... Fifty-five years after Nuremberg, the lessons of the past not
only remain unlearned, but the tragedy is being repeated. Instead of
diminishing over time, [genocidal] assaults have continued .... Regrettably,
this international criminality has been accompanied by a culture of
impunity .... If human security is to be safeguarded, this culture of impunity
must be replaced by a culture of accountability.
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law scholars have noted that human rights play an ever larger role in
Canadian foreign policy-for example, in the realm of development
10 2
assistance.
Canadians themselves seem to support the government's rhetoric
on human rights. One participant in the government's survey of the
foreign policy priorities of Canadians captured the view of many
Canadians in stating that "Canada should endorse and actively
champion the principle that it is only by unequivocally and
consistently embracing the full range of universal human rights
standards that governments will provide true and sustainable
security for their people.' 0 3 Another participant stated: "We cannot
sustain our values and quality of life if we do not defend these values
04
across the globe.'
B. Tort Suits as a Means of Dealingwith Gross Violations of Human
Rights
Tort suits are appropriate and advisable in cases of gross
violations of human rights.' 0 5 Tort law may seem too watered-down a
concept to apply to genocide, torture, and other gross violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law.' 0 6 Our impulse is

Id.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 846.
102.
103.
A DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 95, at 7 (quoting a Dialogue
participant).
104.
Id. at 17 (quoting a Dialogue participant).
105.
Some argue that states are obligated under international law to provide a
remedy for victims of human rights violations even if the state is not responsible for the
violation. See Andrew Byrnes, Civil Remedies for Torture Committed Abroad: An
Obligation under the Convention against Torture, in SCOTT, supra note 7, at 539-40
(arguing that although "CAT does not require that the resources of a State party's civil
law system be made available to persons who wish to pursue actions or other remedies
for acts of torture which occurred outside that State-and for which that State is not
otherwise responsible," Articles 14(1) and (2) leave room for civil suits); Van Schaack,
supra note 16, at 166-68 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
ICCPR, the American Convention and the Torture Convention and noting that "all
require states to provide effective remedies within their national courts for victims of
violations of fundamental right guaranteed by those instruments" and arguing that
they should not be read to apply "only when it is the State Party that is responsible for
the treaty violation"). Professor Craig Scott has posed the question whether the mere
insertion of Article 14(2) after 14(1) in the CAT is encouragement of civil suits in cases
of torture. Craig Scott, Beyond Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Terms of Debate:
Conceptualizing International Human Rights Torts in Terms of Transnational Law,
Alien Tort Claims Under Attack, Presentation at American Society for International
Law Conference (Apr. 1, 2004).
106.
Damage awards may seem too petty a remedy for gross violations of human
rights, however, civil tort suits are not the only place where monetary awards are used
as remedies for violations of human rights. See Stephens, supra note 76, at 604.
International human rights bodies also use non-criminal sanctions like damages,
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to condemn these acts in the harshest terms possible. To take an
extreme example, after World War II, Winston Churchill had to be
0 7
talked out of the idea of summarily executing the Nazi leadership.'
08
But tort has value despite its seeming insipidity.'
1. The Benefits of Tort Suits for Human Rights Violations
The argument that tort law is a valuable tool for addressing
human rights abuses has been made extensively in the context of the
U.S. tort scheme.' 0 9
a. Some Measure of Justice When Criminal Law Sanctions Not
Available
Proponents of the ATCA and TVPA concede that "complete
justice for victims of violence ideally includes criminal prosecution as
well as a civil tort remedy .

. . ."110

Nevertheless, they argue that

"civil remedies are that much more important" due to the rarity of
international criminal prosecutions."'
Even where criminal
prosecutions are available, "an international tort remedy may
complement such a proceeding... [by] offer[ing] victims of violence a
legal remedy which they control and which may satisfy needs not met
112
by the criminal law system."
b. Satisfaction and Perhaps Compensation for Victims
The Center for Constitutional Rights, a U.S. non-governmental
organization (NGO) responsible for bringing many ATCA cases,

reparations and findings of liability. Id. (citing the example of the Velasquez-Rodriguez
case where the Inter-American Human Rights Court found the government of
Honduras responsible for human rights abuses, ordering it to investigate the fate of the
disappeared person, to punish those responsible and to prevent future disappearances
and ordering Honduras to pay reparations to the family); see also Inter-American Court
of Human Rights: Judgment in Velasquez-Rodriquez Case (Forced Disappearance and
Death of Individual in Honduras), 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989). In many countries, restitution
is a standard part of criminal punishment.
107.
JONATHAN GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 151, 182 (2000).
108.
See Stephens, supra note 76, at 603-05; see also Van Schaack, supra note
16, at 166-68.
109.
See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 233-38 (1996); Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of
the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2101-04 (1998); Stephens, supra note 76,
at 603-05; Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 143-44.
110.
Stephens, supra note 76, at 581.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
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contends that for plaintiffs "satisfaction comes from the mere filing of
a lawsuit, from confronting the defendant in court or forcing him to
flee from the U.S., and from obtaining judgment from a U.S. court
which makes a formal record of the human rights violations and of
the defendant's responsibility."1 1 3 Although traditionally, ATCA
plaintiffs have had difficulties enforcing judgments, tort-unlike
4
Canadian or many international criminal remedies'1 -offers the
prospect of compensation. This prospect may be more than illusory at
example,
least in cases against corporations. In Doe v. Unocal,1 1for
5
plaintiffs settled out of court for an undisclosed amount.
c. Showing Respect for Life in Other Countries
Discussing the lawsuits in which his clinic is involved, Noah
Novogrosky, director of the International Human Rights Program at
the University of Toronto frames the issue as one of respect:
Taking an interest in conflicts in Africa matters to survivors. It shows
that a life in Africa is not worth less than a life in Toronto. We can care
for people who live in very different cultures and communities because
116
we are all bound together by the basic principle of human rights.

Addressing
d.
Investigate

Cases the Government Lacks the Incentive to

In some cases, tort law is superior to criminal law for dealing
with human rights violations for practical reasons: the ability of
individuals to initiate a suit rather than having to rely on a state is
an advantage because "states have little incentive to investigate and
prosecute another state's human rights offences."'11 7 Tort suits may
also push public knowledge of wrongdoing through investigation that

John Terry, Taking Filrtiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside the United
113.
States Should Accept Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed Abroad,
in SCOTT, supra note 7, at 112-13 (citing Michael Ratner & Beth Stephens, The Centre
for Constitutional Rights: Using Law and the Filartiga Principle in the Fight for
Human Rights (1993) (unpublished paper, on file with the Centre for Constitutional
Rights)).
114.
The ICC in theory will attempt to provide for victim compensation via its
Victims Trust Fund. See http://www.icc-cpi.int/vtf.html. Pursuant to Article 75, para. 2
of the Rome Statute, the Court may order a convicted person to pay money for
compensation, restitution or rehabilitation. See id.
See Synopsis of Doe v. Unocal, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/corporate115.
accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=lrRSFKnmmm&Content=45.
Nicholas Keung, U of T Human Rights Clinic Makes Law School A
116.
Crusade,TORONTO STAR, Jan. 4, 2004, at A4.
117.
Terry, supra note 113, at 115.
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leads to the identification of the responsible individual, punishment,
18
and compensation.1
e. Empowering Victims
Tort suits empower victims by giving them a role not only in
initiating, but also in shaping the suit. Unlike in a criminal case,
control is nominally in the hands of the victim, rather than a
government prosecutor. The individual, rather than the government,
is the gateway to justice. In tort suits, victims can tell their stories on
their terms rather than in a criminal trial where the prosecutor is
focusing on establishing the requisite elements to prove guilt. 119
f. Giving Human Rights a Bigger Role in the Foreign Policy CostBenefit Analysis
Tort suits may also have the power to affect foreign policy in
positive ways. After a century of holocausts met with apathy and
120
bureaucratic foot-dragging from the powerful nations of the world,
there is a strong case for adding a human rights dimension to the
foreign policy calculation.
Professors Anne-Marie Slaughter and
David Bosco laud the trend of the decentralization and the
democratization of foreign policy: "When traditional diplomacy proves
inadequate to the task of enforcing international law and justice,
plaintiffs should be able to carve out new diplomatic channels,
bypassing the uncertainty of political negotiations and compensating
for the weakness of international tribunals by turning to effective
national courts." 12 1 In particular, they note the impact of suits levied
against corporations:
If the diplomatic impact of suits against individuals has been limited,
not so the growing body of litigation against foreign and multinational
corporations for violations of international law .... By targeting major
corporations and business concerns, private plaintiffs have thus become
a diplomatic force in their own right, forcing governments to pay
122
attention at the highest levels.

118.
Stephens, supra note 76, at 603.
119.
At least one recent study has found that in the context of international
criminal trials, victim witnesses tend to have a bad experience, at least in part due to
the differing agenda of prosecutors. See generally ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR
CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE (2005).

120.

See generally SAMANTHA POWERS, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND

THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).

121.
Id.
122.
Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN
AFF. 102, 107 (2000).
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Harold Koh makes a similar point in arguing for transnational
litigation, arguing that, in addition to seeking compensation and
redress for individual victims, transnational public law plaintiffs seek
prospective aim[s] as well: to promote a political settlement in which
will
entities
and
nongovernmental
both
governmental
participate... Even a judgment that the plaintiff cannot enforce
against the defendant in the rendering forum empowers the plaintiff by
123
creating a bargaining chip for use in other political fora.

2. The Drawbacks of Tort Suits for Human Rights Violations
Unsurprisingly, not everyone is as enthusiastic about using tort
to redress human rights violations. There is a significant body of
scholarship that discusses the drawbacks of Filartiga-stylesuits. The
common criticisms of the ATCA and the TVPA are, by and large, the
flipsides of the benefits usually cited. Perhaps the most compelling
criticisms for Canada are those that go to the legitimacy of the
undertaking under international law.
a. The Role of Courts in Shaping Foreign Policy
Detractors of human rights tort suits often argue that courts
have no business deciding cases that have foreign policy implications.
Some frame their concerns in terms of the unfitness of courts to make
what are essentially political decisions. Judge Bork's concurrence in
the Tel-Oren case is often cited for the proposition that foreign policy
124
concerns are best left to political branches of the government.
Others argue that it is undemocratic for judges to make decisions
that should be made by politically accountable actors. As one scholar
explains, "[t]he most significant cost of international human rights
litigation is that it shifts responsibility for official condemnation and
sanction of foreign governments away from elected political officials
to private plaintiffs and their representatives.' 1 25 Bradley notes that
"[t]he plaintiffs and their representatives decide whom to sue, when
to sue, and which claims to bring,"126 but laments that "[tihese
actors ... have neither the expertise nor the constitutional authority
to determine U.S. foreign policy. Nor, unlike our elected officials, will

Koh, supra note 82, at 2349.
123.
124.
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring); see also Jan Klabbers, Doing the Right Thing? Foreign Tort Law
and Human Rights, in Scott, supra note 7, at 565 (arguing that that these disputes are
inherently political and that "every attempt to solve political disputes judicially is
almost always suspect").
BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 460.
125.
126.
Id.
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these actors have the incentive to weigh the benefits of this litigation
'12 7
against its foreign relations costs.
These arguments, however, ignore the fact that a judge's
insulation from politics and special interest groups is potentially a
great advantage. Moreover, democracy is not always the best way to
protect human rights or minorities. Courts play an important role in
ensuring that the human rights of the minority are protected, even
when it may be in the majority's interest to trample them. 128 In
Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court case that
declared unconstitutional state laws mandating segregated schools,
129
exemplifies the judiciary's protective role.
The United States' experience with the law on sovereign
immunity should serve as a reminder that leaving the decisions over
issues raised by tort cases, such as sovereign immunity, exclusively to
the political branches of government is problematic. The United
States changed its law on sovereign immunity specifically to diminish
the role of the political branches in determining when suits against
states and state officials could proceed. 130 Until the 1970s, even after
the restrictive form of sovereign immunity was formally recognized in
the United States, "the determination of whether a suit was barred
under the principles of the Restatement was made not by the courts
but by the State Department."'131 In the 1970s, the U.S. Congress
grew concerned that the law on sovereign immunity "was leaving
immunity decisions subject to diplomatic pressures rather than to the
rule of law."'132 Congress reported:
From a legal standpoint, if the [State] Department applies the
restrictive principle in a given case, it is in the awkward position of a
political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already
before the courts ....
From a foreign relations standpoint, the initiative
is left to the foreign state . . . . From the standpoint of the private

litigant, considerable uncertainty results. A private party who deals
with a foreign government entity cannot be certain that his legal
dispute with a foreign sovereign will not be decided on the basis of
nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession
33
with the Department of State.1

127.

Id.

128.

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 46 (2000) ("Democracies are

not always right. When majority decisions are unjust, dissenting minorities must have
the capacity to appeal to a higher law.").
129.
See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130.
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
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Thus in 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA, which "codified the
existing common law of sovereign immunity"'134 and abolished the
Department of State's role in determining immunity. 135 The concerns
raised by the U.S. Congress apply not only to the United States and
the issue of sovereign immunity, but rather speak more broadly to the
dangers of political branches having too great an influence in the
outcome of litigation against states and state officials.
Regarding the fitness of courts to make political decisions, the
words of Justice Wilson of the Canadian Supreme Court seem apt.
Justice Wilson observed in response to arguments about judicial
competence to decide political issues in Operation Dismantle that
"however unsuited Courts may be for the task, they are called upon
all the time to decide questions of principle and policy." 136 Further,
Justice Wilson noted that
[tihe word "justiciable" ... is legitimately capable of denoting almost
any question. That is to say, the questions are few which are
intrinsically incapable of submission to a tribunal having an
established procedure, with an orderly presentation of such evidence as
is available, for the purpose of an adjudication from which practical
137
consequences in human conduct are to follow.

b. The Costs to Foreign Policy
On a related front, others base their arguments against ATCAstyle suits on the sheer costs to the state's foreign policy interests. In
the Sosa case, Paul Clement (then-deputy U.S. Solicitor General)
argued that ATCA suits "provide tremendous problems for the foreign
policy interests of the United States.' 138 The U.S. position in Sosa is
consistent with the current administration's position in a number of
ATCA cases. 139 Again, however, the current cost-benefit analysis used
by governments to structure their foreign policy appears to
undervalue human rights: if the government wishes to preserve good

134.
135.

Id.
Id.

Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] S.C.R. 441.
136.
137.
Id. (quoting Melville Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296, 299
(1925)).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 9.
138.
Stephens, supra note 39, at 169 (noting that contrary to its position in prior
139.
administrations,
[u]nder the current Bush Administration, . . .the Department of Justice has
strenuously opposed human rights litigation, intervening in a dozen cases to
challenge both the modern interpretation of the ATCA and its application in
particular cases. Common to each of these interventions is the claim that
judicial review of allegations of gross human rights abuses constitutes an
unconstitutional interference with executive branch foreign affairs powers.
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relations with a country because, for example, it is a major trading
partner or has oil, then incentives to press for them to obey
international human rights or humanitarian law are minimal. U.S.
foreign policy with China is an oft-cited example of this
conundrum. 140 Empowering individuals to take on human rights
abusers is one way to tilt this imbalance to a healthier point.
c. Legal Imperialism
One argument against international human rights litigation
under the ATCA relates to legal imperialism and distance from the
areas where the underlying events have occurred. Curtis explains
that "the adjudication of these foreign human rights abuses by a U.S.
court may disconnect these events from the society most affected by
the abuses. ' 14 1 In a compelling criticism, Chibundu argues that "a
claim for international legitimacy must be grounded on more than
narrow domestic propriety. .. 142 Chibundu explains:
As appealing as it may thus appear at first blush, the arrogation by a
municipal court of the unbridled power to punish wrongdoing under the
guise of enforcing international law should be resisted not only on
account of its effectiveness, but more fundamentally because of what it
says about the social distribution of power within the international
143
community.

Or as fugitive from the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) alleged war criminal, and former
President of the Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, wrote to the
U.S. district judge hearing an ATCA case against him,
Can you really hope to find truth, or do justice, or protect rights of
people in distant nations? ...Do you really believe that attaching a
U.S. dollar sign to human tragedy around the world by empty
14 4
judgments in uncontested lawsuits is a step toward peace or justice?

This view, however, may define "community" too narrowly, at
least in the realm of human rights. As Michael Ignatieff put it:
"Human rights create extraterritorial relationships between people

140.
See Margaret Huang, U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward China, FOREIGN
POLICY IN Focus, Mar. 2001, available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol6/08IFchinahr.pdf;
George Kourous & Tom Barry, U.S. China Policy: Trade, Aid, and Human Rights,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Nov. 1996, available at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/voll/
china.html.
141.
BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 470.
142.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1073.
143.
Id. at 1147.
144.
Thomas E. Vanderbloemen, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed
Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the
United States, 50 DUKE L.J. 917, 924 (2000) (quoting David Rohde, Jury in New York
Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2000, at A10).
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who can't protect themselves and people who have the resources to
assist them. The rights revolution since 1945 has widened the bounds
of community so that our obligations no longer cease at our own
frontiers.' 1 45 Ignatieffs comments on intervention by force are apt in
the litigation context as well. Ignatieff notes: "Those who criticize
interventions in the name of human rights on the grounds that we
must always respect the sovereignty of a state need to remember that
146
the victims of that state are usually imploring us to intervene.
Similarly, victims of abuses in other states are imploring Canada to
give them an opportunity to have their day in court against their
oppressors.
d. Transitional Justice
Others have noted that the suits have costs from a transitional
justice perspective. Amnesties, although criticized by many, are a
way to get a repressive regime to leave power. If a court allows a tort
suit to go forward despite an amnesty, the court diminishes the value
of the amnesty, which may make it more difficult to get officials to
agree to leave power. 147 Given that local institutions must do most of
the work in protecting human rights and that the international
community can only act as an occasional stand-in, sometimes
"stability ... may count more than justice."'148
In a way, it seems that the more effective these suits are as a
stick in the international human rights incentive system, the more
valid this transitional justice concern. Paradoxically, the unlikelihood
of recovery in these suits in fact seems an advantage with respect to
this transitional justice concern. There seems to be no evidence,
however, that the prospect of ATCA or TVPA suits has affected
tyrants' decisions to leave power. Moreover, as discussed below,
courts may bar suits on exhaustion grounds if the state where the
conduct occurred has some alternative remedy in place, even if the
remedy is tied to an amnesty. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
getting the leaders of a rogue regime to leave power is just one aspect
of transitional justice. Other critical components include the
149
encouragement of respect for human rights and accountability,

145.

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 50,

(Amy Gutmann ed., 2001).
146.

Id.

147.
See Eric Posner, Remarks, The Alien Tort Claims Act Under Attack, ASIL
Proceedings, April 1, 2004.
148.
IGNATIEFF, supra note 128, at 25 (discussing the slide of regions, such as
the Balkans, Rwanda and Southern Islamic front of former U.S.S.R., into civil war).
149.
See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 9-10 (1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
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which tort suits for human rights violations seek to promote and
amnesties undermine.
e. Problems with Relying on Customary International Law
Some of the criticisms of these Filartiga-stylesuits are specific to
the broad wording of the ATCA itself-in particular its definitional
reliance on customary international law or the "law of nations"-and
are perhaps instructive for Canada. Chibundu decries the haphazard
ways in which U.S. courts have been interpreting and thereby
creating international customary law:
[Ilf [domestic courts] are to usefully and legitimately fill the lacunae in
the making and enforcement of customary international law, those who
have thus far unquestioningly resorted to them to create their image of
what the international society ought to be need to engage in a more
searching inquiry of the role of law in shaping and creating respect for
the rule of law within a genuinely international community.150

Curtis frames the issue as the "cost to democracy," explaining that
customary international law involves fewer "U.S. democratic inputs
than other forms of law applied by U.S. courts" and noting that there
exist "substantial uncertainties today concerning both the way in
which customary international law is formed and the specific content
of this law."'15 1 Curtis bemoans the reliance of the judges on academic
literature written by experts of questionable objectivity, due to
relative
judge's "unfamiliarity with international law and the
1 52
difficulty of doing research on international law questions.'
The risk posed by reliance on broad and vague terms such as
"the law of nations" can be greatly diminished by more specific
legislation. Even Chibundu appears to embrace the TVPA due to its
For example, on the issue of sovereign immunity,
specificity.
Chibundu explains that, with the TVPA, "the legislative branch
crafted a clearly defined civil liability statute which expresses the
policies of the United States government with regard to individual
liability for 'torture' or 'extrajudicial killing' committed by a foreign
official or an agent of a foreign government." 153 The scheme reflects
an understanding of institutional competencies: "The right to relief is
matched against both the competence of a foreign government to

Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 9-28 (1996).
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1079-80 (arguing that we need to assess "the
150.
propriety of such use of courts within a framework where domestic institutions are not
otherwise accountable to the 'international community..
BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 465.
151.
Id. at 467.
152.
153.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1114.

2005]

TORTAU CANADIEN

regulate the behavior of its officials and agents-including the
functioning of its own judiciary-and the practical limitations of U.S.
courts to evaluate evidence of extraterritorial conduct." 154 Finally,
Chibundu lauds its transparency, nothing that "[t]he political
branches of the United States government are thus directly
answerable for the correctness or otherwise of the policy choices
'155
clearly evident in the law.
Therefore, on balance, tort suits for violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law are worthwhile. Tort suits offer
the significant benefits of giving victims control over their day in
court, shifting governments' cost-benefit analyses on human rights,
and, particularly in the case of corporations, offering victims the
possibility of compensation for their suffering. As set forth above, the
disadvantages commonly cited are overstated and, in many cases, can
be avoided by clear legislation. Even accepting that providing a tort
remedy for victims of torture, crimes against humanity, genocide, war
crimes, and the like is desirable, an important question remains:
would these measures work outside the context of the U.S. legal
system and U.S. society?
C. Would Tort Suits Work in the CanadianContext?
1. Constitutionality of Canadian Legislation
A threshold question is whether legislation like the ATCA or the
TVPA would be constitutional in Canada. In the United States, the
ATCA passes constitutional muster because Article 3 provides that
the "law of nations" is federal common law. 156 Thus, the suits arise
under federal law and fall under the federal question jurisdiction of
federal courts. 15 7 In Canada, the use of customary international law
in itself does not pose constitutional problems: "Customary
international law may be applied by Canadian courts without any
need for an express legislative act, unless there is a clear conflict with

154.
155.

Id.
Id.

156.
See BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 466 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
246 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1473 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Penalrala, 630 F.2d 826, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995). A number of scholars, however, have
challenged Filartiga-stylecases based on the argument that the reasoning of Filartiga
"relies upon a flawed assumption that customary international law . . . is federal
common law and, as such is actionable in U.S. federal courts." Ryan Goodman & Derek
P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing.-InternationalHuman Rights and Federal Common
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 468-70 (1997) ("Filartiga properly followed the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on post-Erie federal common law.").
157.

See BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 466.
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statute law or common law. '158 Nevertheless, legislation allowing for
universal jurisdiction over certain types of conduct would increase
transparency and provide courts with much needed guidance in
navigating the tricky waters of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and
the like.
Canadian federalism, however, may raise an obstacle. Under
Canadian constitutional law, it is unlikely that the federal
Parliament could pass tort legislation for violations of international
human rights and humanitarian norms. In Canada, "property and
civil rights in the province," which a leading Canadian constitutional
scholar contends "is apt to include most of the private law of property,
contracts and torts and their many derivatives," fall15 9under the
jurisdiction of the provinces, not the federal government.
Arguably, however, if Canadian tort legislation for violations of
human rights norms were framed as an adjunct to a federal criminal
scheme, such as the CAHWCA, then it could fall within federal
domain. Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act of 1867 gives the
federal Parliament the power to make laws in relation to "[tihe
criminal law, except the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction,
160
This provision
but including the procedure in criminal matters."
16 1
makes criminal law a federal responsibility.
Canadian case law leaves open the possibility of financial
compensation where it is closely related to a criminal sanction. For
example, in R v. Zelensky,
the Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of six to three, upheld a
provision of the Criminal Code that authorized a criminal court, upon
convicting an accused of an indictable offence, to order the accused to
pay the victim compensation for any loss or damage caused by the
16 2
commission of the offence.

The award of compensation bore appeared civil in three ways:
(1) the order was to be made, not at the request of the prosecutor or at
the initiative of the court, but only on the application of the victim; (2)
the amount of compensation was to be related, not to the degree of

158.

William Schabas, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN

CHARTER 16 (2d ed. 1996); see also Suresh v. Canada [2000] D.L.R. 629, 659. But see,
Baker v. Canada [1999] S.C.R. 817, 861 (an international obligation created by treaty
or convention has no direct application in Canada until implemented by legislation.
Nevertheless, even when an international norm has not been implemented, "the values
reflected in international human rights law may help inform the contextual approach
to statutory interpretation and judicial review.").
159.

PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, Vol. 1 at 17-2 (citing

Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867).
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), § 91(27), as reprinted in
160.
R.S.C., No. 5 (App. II 1985).
161.

PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 435 (student ed. 1997).

162.

Id. at 457.
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blameworthiness of the accused, but to the value of the victim's loss;
and (3) the order was to be enforced, not by the state as a fine would be,
16 3
but by the victim as if it were a civil judgment.

The majority and the dissent quibbled over the nature of the
remedy-the majority claimed that it was predominantly criminal in
nature; the dissent claimed it was impermissibly civil.
Nevertheless, Zelensky did not decide "whether the federal
Parliament could authorize a person, who had suffered a loss as the
result of the breach of a criminal law, to bring a separate civil action
164
to recover damages (or other relief) outside the criminal process."'
This question is precisely the one that matters for possible Canadian
TVPA-style legislation. One commentator thinks such a move is
unlikely:
The fact that the Court divided in Zelensky, and the emphasis in the
majority opinion on the fact that the compensation order was a
discretionary part of the sentencing process, suggest that the Court will
be unwilling to uphold a separate civil right of action as ancillary to a
16 5
criminal law.

The issue comes down to the "pith and substance" of the
legislation: "[w]here the pith and substance of a federal law is not the
creation of a civil remedy, but is some other matter within federal
power, there is no reason to doubt the validity of a civil remedy
provided for enforcement of the law."'1 66 For example, in MacDonald
v. Vapor, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provision of the
federal Trade Marks Act was invalid because the provision was in
essence based in tort, which came within the domain of property and
civil rights in the province. 16 7 By contrast, in Papp v. Papp, the Court
upheld the validity of a provision of the federal Divorce Act of 1968
for the custody of children of a dissolved marriage, which normally
would fall within property and civil rights in the province. 168 The
Court held that the provisions passed constitutional muster because
there was a "rational, functional connection" between the child
custody provisions and the valid divorce provisions of the Divorce Act.
169

It seems most likely that tort legislation would fall to the
provinces. If the legislation were tightly intertwined with a criminal
process in CAHWCA, then it is possible that it could be passed on the
federal level. Although CAHWCA does not explicitly address the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 455.
Id.; MacDonald v. Vapor, [1977] S.C.R. 134, 149.
Papp v. Papp [1970] O.R. 331 (C.A.), 336.
Id.; Hogg, supra note 161, at 455-56.
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issue, the ICC statute provides that compensation can be awarded to
victims for their suffering. 170 Were the legislation to offer the benefit
of giving victims the ability to initiate suits without government
approval and control, however, such a procedure likely would be
deemed too distant from the criminal process, pushing it into the
domain of the provinces.
Further, this Article argues that Canadian tort legislation
should encompass jus cogens violations of human rights norms such
as the prohibition against torture; it should not merely address
violations in the context of armed conflict or an attack on a civilian
population. Thus, the tort legislation would exceed the scope of
CAHWCA, straining arguments that the "pith and substance" of the
two regimes were the same. As a result, any Canadian tort legislation
likely would have to be provincial.
2. Do ATCA-style Suits Translate Into Canadian?
Beyond the question of constitutionality lies an array of practical
concerns as to how tort legislation would operate in the context of
Canadian culture and the Canadian legal system. An examination of
some of the key practical questions reveals that the Canadian legal
system is in fact well-suited to TVPA-style tort suits.
A good way of framing the inquiry is to ask whether tort as a
remedy for human rights abuses "translates" north of the border. A
leading U.S. ATCA scholar, Beth Stephens, has applied Lawrence
Lessig's translation theory to international legal responses to
international law violations. 171 Stephens posits that different legal
systems deal with violations of human rights differently. She
essentially argues that a civil lawsuit in the United States is basically
a private criminal action and outlines the peculiarities of the U.S.
172
legal system that make it a good place for human rights tort suits.
She notes three major features of the U.S. system that make it
particularly suitable for Filartiga-style suits: (1) laws on subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and choice of law; (2) a longstanding tradition of public interest and impact litigation;
173
(3) systematic procedural advantages.
The procedural advantages of the U.S. system Stephens deems
important are : (1) the lack of a loser-pays rule, (2) the availability of

170.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 77(2),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1046.
171.
See Stephens, supra note 28.
172.
See id.
173.
Id. at 11-12. For example, the United States allows for general jurisdiction
over persons transitorily present in the jurisdiction at the time of service and over
corporations that have minimum contacts with the jurisdiction. See id.
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contingency fees, (3) the availability of punitive damages, (4) the
possibility of courts' entering default judgments against countries
that refuse to appear before it, (5) rules allowing for extensive
discovery, (6) extraterritoriality. In the United States, unlike in the
United Kingdom, for example, there is no rule whereby claims can
only be sustained if they would be recognized as actionable in the
place where the dispute's underlying events took place. 174 To
determine whether Filartiga-stylelitigation would work in Canada, it
is useful to consider whether these peculiarities exist in Canada.
a. Subject-matter Jurisdiction, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law
(1) Subject-matter jurisdiction
As discussed above, it is likely that provincial rather than
federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction over the cases.
Therefore, legislation explicitly allowing for ATCA- and TVPA-style
suits would be a matter for the provinces.
Whether the cases and legislation fall in the federal or the
provincial domain, Canadian law offers leeway for the assertion of
universal jurisdiction over the subject matter of certain egregious
violations of international law, particularly those that have been
criminalized under international law. The legislature has asserted
universal jurisdiction in the criminal context with the CAHWCA.
Arguably, applying universal jurisdiction to the civil context is a
logical extension of the concept that certain offences are "significant
' 175
enough to threaten the interests 'of civilization everywhere."
Thus far, however, Canadian courts have not recognized
universal jurisdiction in the civil realm. Although it did not decide the
case based on jurisdiction, the Bouzari court included dicta that bodes
ill for universal jurisdiction absent legislation. Appearing to conflate
the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, the
Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
There is no basis for departing from the real and substantial connection
test [the test for personal jurisdiction] in this kind of case. There is
nothing in the SIA [State Immunity Act] nor in any treaty by which
Canada is bound that would require Ontario to apply a rule of universal
jurisdiction . . . to a civil action for torture abroad by a foreign state.
Nor does there appear to be any norm of customary international law to

Id. at 32-33.
174.
175.
Sung Teak Kim, Note, Adjudicating Violations of International Law:
Defining the Scope of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute-Trajano v. Marcos, 27
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 387, 416 (1994) (quoting Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Federal Jurisdictionover InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 60 (1981)).
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that effect. There is no general practice nor wide-spread legal
acknowledgement by states that civil jurisdiction is to be accorded on
this basis for an action based on foreign torture. There is thus no
reason to displace the usual common law test.. 176

The court ultimately skirted the jurisdiction issue, however, by
177
deciding the case on the basis of state immunity.
(2) Service and Personal Jurisdiction
(a) Service
Canadian rules on service and personal jurisdiction are not
significantly more onerous than those of the United States. A great
challenge in U.S. cases tends to be the issue of service. The strict
rules on service are often difficult to comply with in cases that involve
defendants who live outside the United States and who visit the
178

United States only briefly.
Service on out-of-province defendants is in fact easier for
Canadian plaintiffs than for plaintiffs in the United States. For
example, in Ontario, under Rule 17.02(h) of the Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure, service outside of Ontario is permissible for a claim for

"damage sustained in Ontario arising from tort, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty or breach of confidence, wherever

committed."1 79 The Ontario Court of Appeal recently upheld the

80°
Muscutt
constitutionality of the rule in Muscutt v. Courcelles.
involved the "issue whether the Ontario courts should assume
jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants in claims for damage

176.
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2004] O.A.C. 28.
177.
Id. 38.
178.
See Alvin H. Chu, Vindicating the Tiananmen Square Massacre "The Case
Against Li Peng," 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 199, 211 (2001).
Typically, valid service requires delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the defendant personally, or leaving copies at the defendant's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion. Alternatively, the plaintiff can deliver a copy to an agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Karadzic captures the difficulty of service in the United States. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit deemed service complete when the process
server, Jonathan Soroko, attempted to hand papers to Karadzic in his hotel in New
York during a visit to the United Nations, but the papers were intercepted by a
security agent and Soroko shouted 'You've been served." See id. at 246-47; see also
Doreen Cronin, Recent Decision: Kadic v. Karadzic, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 215, 218
(1997).
179.
Ont. R. Civ. Pro.17.02, R.R.O. 1990, Ont. Reg. 194.
180.
See Teresa Kowalishin, Case Comment, In the Wake of Muscutt v.
Courcelles, 31 C.P.C. (5th.) 232; see also Muscutt v. Courcelles, 213 D.L.R. (4th.) 577,
48 (Ont. C.A. 2002).
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sustained in Ontario as a result of tort committed elsewhere."1 8 1 The
case-argued together with four other appeals based on similar fact
patterns-involved an Ontario resident who had suffered serious
personal injury outside the province. The common theme of the cases
was that "[t]he injured party returns to Ontario, endures pain and
suffering, receives medical treatment, and suffers loss of income and
amenities of life, all as a result of the injury sustained outside the
province. '18 2 Service of process, however, does not end the inquiry.
Like U.S. courts, Ontario courts must also have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.
(b) Personal Jurisdiction
Although Canadian law appears not to allow for transient or tag
jurisdiction,ls 3 relied on by many ATCA plaintiffs in the United
States, 184 personal jurisdiction otherwise appears to involve a more
fluid analysis in Canadian courts than in U.S. courts, which may
alleviate the jurisdictional difficulties of potential plaintiffs.
In Canada, jurisdiction over out-of-province or out-of-country
defendants is based on the "real and substantial connection" test. The
test is potentially looser than the "minimum contacts" standard
which generally applies to out-of-state defendants in the United
States. In Morguard8 5 and Hunt,18 6 the Canadian Supreme Court
held that the principles of "order and fairness" require limits on the
reach of provincial jurisdiction against out-of-province defendants,
and that jurisdiction can only be asserted against an out-of-province
18 7
defendant on the basis of a "real and substantial connection."'
Muscatt explained that "the proper exercise of jurisdiction depends on
two principles. First, there is a need for 'order and fairness' and

181.
Muscutt, 213 D.L.R. 1.
182.
Id.
1, 2.
183.
See Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds's
Jurisdictionand Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 469, 485 (1995) (noting
that relinquishing tag jurisdiction "is the carrot which is enticing the Europeans (and
the Japanese and Canadians) to join the negotiations").
184.
Tag jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of the defendant in the
jurisdiction irrespective of any link between his or her presence and the injury. See
Thomas E. Vanderbloemen, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the United
States, 50 DUKE L.J. 917, 919 (2000). The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, widely
ratified in Europe, rejects tag jurisdiction and requires a connection between the forum
state and the claim. See Stephens, supra note 76, at 599.
185.
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 46 C.P.C. (2d) 1, 15 R.P.R.
(2d) 1, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, 122 N.R. 81, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 217, 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 160,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1990 CarswellBC 283, 1990 CarswellBC 767 (S.C.C.).
Hunt v. T & N plc [1994] 1 W.W.R. 129, 21 C.P.C. (3d) 269.
186.
187.
Muscutt, 213 D.L.R. 15.
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jurisdictional restraint. Second, there must be a 'real and substantial
18 8
connection."'
Muscatt also provided a list of factors relevant to the
determination of whether the real and substantial connection test has
been met: (1) "The connection between the forum and the plaintiffs
claim";' 8 9 (2) "The connection between the forum and the
defendant"; 9 0 (3) "Unfairness to the defendant in assuming
jurisdiction";191 (4) "Unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming
193
jurisdiction";1 92 (5) "The involvement of other parties to the suit";
(6) "The court's willingness to recognize and enforce an extraprovincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis"; 194 (8)
195
"Whether the case is inter-provincial or international in nature";
and (9) "Comity and the standards of jurisdiction, recognition and
196
enforcement prevailing elsewhere."'
Heeding the guidance of the Supreme Court of Canada that the
"real and substantial test is flexible," the court noted that "[w]hile the
defendant's contact with the jurisdiction is an important factor, it is
not a necessary factor."'1 97 It bears noting, however, that this sort of
"doing-business" or contacts-based jurisdiction is also not widely
198
accepted in international law.
The application of this rule to human rights cases has yet to be
fully tested. In the Bouzari case for example, the trial court skirted
the issue of jurisdiction. The court explained that the brutal acts
occurred in Iran and caused injury in Iran, albeit injury that had
lingering effects in Canada, and that therefore "the logical conclusion
would [normally] be that there is no real and substantial

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. 9 34 (quoting Morguard).
Id. 99 77-81.
Id. IT 82-85.
Id. 99 86-87.

192.
Id. IT 88-90.
193.
Id. 9 91-91.
194.
Id. 99 93-94.
195.
Id.
95-100. The court explained that "the fact that [it] [wals an
interprovincial [as opposed to international] case clearly weigh[ed] in favour of
assuming jurisdiction." Id.
100.
196.
Id. 99 101-10.
197.
Id.
74. In a demonstration of this flexibility and of openness to
international law, the court also provided guidance for cases involving international
defendants by concluding that in such cases, "international standards and standards
applied in the defendant's jurisdiction are helpful in determining whether the real and
substantial connection test has been met on the basis of damage sustained within the
jurisdiction." Id.
108.
198.
See Van Schaak, supra note 16, at 176 ("[T]he main bargaining chip for the
United States [at the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters] is the relinquishment of forms of U.S. jurisdiction deemed
exorbitant from a continental perspective," including transient (or tag) jurisdiction and
"general doing-business jurisdiction.").
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connection."'19 9 The court, however, left room for flexibility in cases
that involve torture. It noted:
[T]he plaintiff here is seeking damages for torture. Clearly, he can not
[sic] bring such an action in Iran, given the facts alleged. Given this
reality, I do not feel it appropriate to decide this case on conflicts rules
alone. It may be that the Canadian courts will modify the rules on
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens where an action for damages for
200
torture is brought with respect to events outside the forum.

Instead, the trial court and the appeals court decided the case on
20 1
sovereign immunity grounds.
3. Choice of Law
Choice-of-law considerations do not present major difficulties for
Canadian tort plaintiffs any more than in the United States. In the
United States, choice-of-law rules allow for some flexibility on the law
to be applied. 20 2 In Canada, although the Supreme Court has
instructed that tort cases are generally governed by the law of the
place where the tort was committed, 20 3 it has left some wiggle room
for international cases. As Justice La Forest explained, "because a
rigid rule on the international level could give rise to injustice, in
certain circumstances, I am not averse to retaining a discretion in the
20 4
court to apply our own law to deal with such circumstances."
Justice La Forest qualified the statement by adding that he could
20 5
"imagine few cases where this would be necessary."
(b) Tradition of Public Interest and Impact Litigation
The United States has a long history of public interest and
impact litigation, 20 6 which manifests itself in the ATCA litigation.
20 7
Nonprofit legal groups have brought the bulk of U.S. ATCA cases.
Plaintiffs rely on "advocates who can afford to ignore the bottom line,
including law school clinics, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and private practitioners willing to engage in § 1350 litigation on a

199.
Bouzari v. Iran (Islamic Republic), [2004] D.L.R. 406.
200.
Id.
17.
201.
Id.
Stephens, supra note 28, at 11.
202.
Muscutt v. Courcelles, [2002] D.L.R. 577 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994]
203.
S.C.R. 1022).
204.
Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] S.C.R. 1022.
205.
Id.
206.
Stephens, supra note 28, at 12-13; see also George Norris Stavis, Note,
Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases: Flexibility for Non-Profit
Litigators?,31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 215 (1999).
207.
See Stavis, supra note 206, at 214.
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pro bono basis, [because they] are usually the only legal actors willing
20 8
to represent ATCA and TVPA claimants."
Canada lacks the United States' long history of public interest
litigation. 20 9 Public interest litigation, however, appears to be gaining
ground in Canada. 210 Courts have eliminated the key hurdles facing
public interest litigants: standing and mootness. 2 11 Finlay v. Canada
(Minister of Finance),212 a Canadian Supreme Court decision on
standing, opened the door for more public interest litigation. 214
Whereas prior to Finlay "public interest standing was limited to cases
challenging the validity of legislation," afterwards standing was
expanded "to embrace the proceedings commenced to review the
validity of administrative action. ' 215 Public interest litigation has yet
to garner the type of support it enjoys in the United States, but new
organizations resembling U.S. groups are sprouting up in Canada.
For example, the International Coalition Against Torture (InCAT)
was founded in 2003216 and Human Rights Watch has opened a
Toronto office. 2 1 7 In addition, the Faculty of Law at the University of
Toronto has recently opened a legal clinic for students as part of its
218
International Human Rights Program.

208.
Id. at 214-15 (quoting Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized:
Collecting § 1350 Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177, 2178 (1998)).
209.
See TED MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION & THE
COURT PARTY 22 (2000) ("In 1975, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the Supreme
Court of Canada, the historian Kenneth McNaught wrote that 'Our judges and lawyers,
supported by the press and public opinion, reject any concept of the courts as a positive
instrument in the political process."').
210.
See, e.g., Chris Tollefson, Advancing an Agenda? A Reflection on Recent
Developments in Canadian Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 U. N.B. L.J.
175, 194 (2002) (arguing that the growing field of public interest environmental
litigation has enhanced the ability of citizens to ensure governments follow through on
legal commitments they have made to protect the environment and that there has been
a positive change in the attitudes of courts towards the participation of public interest
environmental groups); see also infra note 224, at 102 ("Canada is currently witnessing
an increase in public interest litigation ....
");id. at 13 (arguing that since the adoption
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, "[a] long tradition of parliamentary
supremacy has been replaced by a regime of constitutional supremacy verging on
judicial supremacy").
211.
MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 209, at 54.
212.
Finlay v. Canada, [1986] S.C.R. 607. Finlay is one of a series of cases,
dubbed the "Standing Quartet," which relaxed the standing rules in Canada for public
interest litigants. See infra note 224, at 57, 92.
214.
Tollefson, supra note 210, at 183.
215.
Id.
216.
InCAT, I Never Thought .
http://www.incat.org/president-message.php
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
217.
See Human Rights Watch, Get Involved, Toronto Young Advocates,
http://www.hrw.org/canada/toronto/ya/.
218.
Keung, supra note 116, at A4.
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In the context of human rights, the tort-shy nature of Canadians
appears to be changing. Bouzari, Arar, Sampson and others are
examples of Canadians who believe that tort is a way for their voices
to be heard and their torturers to be punished. As Mr. Bouzari puts
it, "If each time they move their arm back to strike a victim they
think, '[t]his will cost ten thousand dollars,' they will not so easily do
it. They will have to stop. We will make it impossible for them to
commit these crimes any longer." 219 When confronted with the dismal
figures on collection in U.S. cases, 220 Mr. Bouzari focuses on the value
of finding a forum in which to tell one's story and letting the truth be
known. 221 Politicians are likewise beginning to see the value in this
opportunity. Based on the lobbying related to the Bouzari case, the
be amended and
New Democratic Party has proposed that the SIA
22 2
may propose a private members' bill to amend it.
c. Systematic Procedural Advantages
(1) Loser-Pays Rule
Canadian plaintiffs are beginning to enjoy some of the same
procedural perks as American litigants. Although the traditional rule
in the provincial courts is that the loser pays costs, 223 forming a
barrier to public interest litigation, 22 4 this rule has relaxed in recent
years. 2 25 In some cases, courts have begun awarding costs to public
interest litigants even when they do not win. 2 2 6 One court reasoned
that awarding costs was appropriate to recognize that "the testing of
the constitutional principles involved in this matter is clearly in the
public interest, since they are at the heart of our constitutional

Krotz, supra note 10, at 65.
219.
See Stavis, supra note 206, at 213-14.
220.
See Notes from InCAT meeting, Jan. 2004, on file with author.
221.
Krotz, supra note 10, at 65.
222.
Stephens, supra note 28, at 29; see also Mark S. Winfield, A Political and
223.
Legal Analysis of Ontario's Environmental Bill of Rights, U. N.B. L.J. 325, 353 n.164
(1998).
The general rule in civil suits is that 'costs follow the cause,' meaning that the
loser pays the costs of the winner. However, such an award is only for 'party
and party,' as opposed to 'solicitor and client' costs. The former are set by tariff
and typically amount to one-half to two-thirds of the actual legal fees incurred.
224.
See generally Lara Friedlander, Costs and the Public Interest Litigant, 40
McGILL L.J. 55, 57, 61 (1995) (arguing for a no-way costs rule for public interest cases
in conjunction with a statutory scheme that would fund public interest litigants).
225.
Tollefson, supra note 210, at 188.
See id.
226.
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democracy. '227 This approach has found support in the Ontario Court
228
of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.
Moreover, when the public interest litigant loses, he or she often
does not have to pay costs. Although there is no formal public interest
costs exception, courts have frequently exercised their discretion to
excuse unsuccessful public interest litigants from costs liability. '229
Simply raising the money for a suit may pose a problem though. One
commentator has noted the problem that funding for public interest
litigation in Canada is "limited in application to both subject matter
and quantum. ' 230 In an effort to address this barrier, courts have
begun to grant interim awards of costs to public interest litigants in
order to facilitate their hiring counsel in complex litigation against
23
the government. '
(2) Class actions
Although note explicitly discussed by Stephens, the possibility
for class action law suits is also a relevant procedural consideration.
Although prohibited under the common law in Canada, "most
provinces now have detailed legislation" on class actions, which are a
potentially useful tool for human rights plaintiffs. '2 32 Moreover,
"[e]ven where there is no legislation on class actions, the Supreme
Court of Canada has now endorsed a broad flexible approach to class
actions"; 233 Ontario and Quebec have passed legislation that allows
them. 234 Ontario's rule on class actions resembles Rule 23 of the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in many ways. 235 According to one
specialist in Ontario civil litigation, "[iun many respects, particularly
certification, the Ontario regime is more liberal. ' 23 6 For example,
there is no numerosity requirement. Rather, there must only be a

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. (quoting Singh v. Canada (A.G.), [1999] F.C. 583).
Id.
Id.
Friedlander, supra note 224, at 61.
Id.

232.

WILLIAM A. STEVENSON & JEAN E. CoT,

CIVIL PROCEDURE ENCYCLOPEDIA

9-2 (2003). As of June 2003, the jurisdictions in Canada with comprehensive class
proceedings legislation in force were: Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, Manitoba, and the Federal Court. Ward Branch, CLASS
ACTIONS IN CANADA 1-1(2003).

233.
Id. at 9-3 (citing Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton (Bennett
Jones & Co.), [2001] S.C.R. 534.
234.
See Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992 S.O., ch. 6; see also Friedlander,
supra note 224, at 61.
235.
See Michael McGowan, Certification of Class Actions in Ontario: A
Comparison of Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 CARSWELL
PRACTICE CASES 172 (1993).

236.

Id.
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class of two or more persons. 237 Moreover, unlike in the U.S. system
23 8
in
where common issues must predominate over individual issues,
Ontario a court must only be satisfied that a class proceeding would
be the "preferable procedure for the resolution of the common
issues." 23 9 Ontario's Class Proceedings 40Act even provides partial
2
subsidization of public interest litigants.
(3) Contingency Fees
As in the United States, contingency fees are permissible in all of
241
the provinces of Canada in civil cases.
(4) Punitive Damages
Punitive damages, which are typically lower than those awarded
in the United States, are nevertheless available in Canada. They "are
awarded against a defendant in exceptional cases for 'malicious,
oppressive and high-handed' misconduct that 'offends the court's
sense of decency.' The test thus limits the award to misconduct that
represents a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent
behaviour." 242
The reasoning courts have given for allowing punitive damages
seems to legitimize their use in human rights tort cases. As one court
has framed it,"Punishment is a legitimate objective not only of the
criminal law but of the civil law as well. Punitive damages serve a
need that is not met either by the pure civil law or the pure criminal
law."243 Stated differently, "there is a substantial consensus
that ...the general objectives of punitive damages are punishment
(in the sense of retribution), deterrence of the wrongdoer and others,
and denunciation (or . .

.

'the means by which the jury or the judge

expresses its outrage at the egregious conduct').

'244

Torture, crimes

Id.
237.
238.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
239.
McGowan, supra note 235 (citing Class Proceedings Act, S.O., s. 5(1)(d)).
Friedlander, supra note 224, at 82.
240.
241.
McIntyre v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2002] C.P.C. 59 (holding that
contingency fees were permissible in civil cases in Ontario as long as they are
reasonable and fair and noting that "every Canadian province and territory other than
Ontario ha[d] enacted legislation or rules of court to permit and regulate the use of
contingency fees").
242.
Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] S.C.R. 595. The court noted that,"[b]ecause
their objective is to punish the defendant rather than compensate a plaintiff (whose
just compensation will already have been assessed), punitive damages straddle the
frontier between civil law (compensation) and criminal law (punishment)." Id.
Id. 37.
243.
Id. 68.
244.
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nothing if not

(5) Default Judgment
As in the United States, default judgments-common in ATCA
cases-are permissible in Canada. 245 In the Bouzari case, for
example, the court noted that since Iran had not defended itself in the
proceeding, it was "deemed to have admitted the truth of all
allegations of fact in the Statement of Claim under the Ontario rules
with respect to default judgment...,,246
(6) Discovery
Although discovery traditionally has been more extensive in the
United States than in Canada, 24 7 the trend in all of the provincial
courts "is to take a wider approach in interpretation." 248 In Canada,
'24 9
"[tihe general rule is the broadening of discovery.
(7) Extraterritoriality
It is unclear whether double actionability or extraterritoritality,
whereby claims can only be sustained if they would be recognized as
250
actionable in the place where the underlying events took place,
would be a hurdle for human rights litigants in Canada. Unlike in the
United Kingdom, where the double actionability rule barred a
number of counts in the Pinochet case, in the United States, there is
no double actionability rule.2 5 1 In Canada, it is unclear whether this
double actionability rule exists. In Tolofson, Justice La Forest
questioned the utility of such a rule: "[G]iven the fact that the

245.
246.

See, e.g., Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. Rule 19.02(1)(a) (1990) (Can).
Bouzari v. Iran (Islamic Republic), [2004] D.L.R. 406, 16.

247. In the United States, the systems of written interrogatories and of
depositions or oral examinations are both in use, with the latter being
extensively used in the Federal Courts. The Federal discovery rules
constituted the first comprehensive scheme of discovery provisions in the
United States and these rules have been followed closely in most State
jurisdictions. There is a wealth of decisions in the United States arising
under State and Federal pre-trial discovery rules which have no real
counterpart in Canada.
GORDON D. CUDMORE, CHOATE ON DISCOVERY 1-4 (2d ed. 1994).

248.
Id. at 1-6.
249. Id.
250.
Stephens, supra note 28, at 32-33.
251.
See Stephens, supra note 28, at 33; R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary
Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 All E.R. 924 (HL).
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jurisdiction of Canadian courts is confined to matters in respect of
which there is a real and substantial connection with the forum
jurisdiction, I seriously wonder whether the requirement that the
252
wrong be actionable in that jurisdiction is really necessary.
Justice La Forest suggests that "the fact that a wrong would not be
actionable within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum if committed
there might be a factor better weighed in considering the issue of
forum non conveniens, or on the international plane, whether
entertaining the action would violate the public policy of the forum
253
jurisdiction."
Overall, Stephens's translation analysis suggests that tort suits
in Canadian courts are an appropriate and viable means of dealing
with gross violations of international human rights law. Legislation
providing for universal jurisdiction over a set of gross human rights
and humanitarian law violations, as outlined below, would make tort
law an even more suitable remedy. In particular, explicit legislation
would address Professor Chibundu's concerns over transparency.
Given Canada's leading role in promoting accountability for human
rights and humanitarian law violations via transnational public law
litigation in the criminal realm (most publicly in its support for the
ICC), it is fitting that Canada play a leading role in the creation of a
complementary scheme of transnational civil law mechanisms.
4. Will the United States Let Canada Get Away with this Sort of
Legislation?
The foreign policy effects of such legislation may be trickier in
the Canadian context because Canada faces a foreign policy problem
that the United States does not: the United States. Eighty-eight
percent of Canada's exports go to the United States. 2 54 According to
the U.S. Commercial Service, "The volume of Canada-U.S. trade last
year was far greater than the total amount of Canada's trade with all
of its other trading partners combined. '255 These statistics, however,
also cut the other way. When Canada did not support the U.S. war in
Iraq, Richard Perle, U.S. policy advisor and noted hawk, said that the
"Canadian and U.S. economies are so intertwined that a backlash
256
against one is a backlash against the other."

252.
Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] S.C.R. 1022.
253.
Id.
Michael Reid, Canada'sNew Spirit, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2003, at 15.
254.
255.
BuyUSA.gov-U.S. Commercial Service, Canada-U.S. Trade Relationship,
http://www.buyusa.gov/canada/en/traderelationsusacanada.html (last visited May 13,
2004).
256.
Jeffrey Simpson, Worried About U.S. Retribution? Don't Be, The GLOBE AND
MAIL, Apr. 9, 2003, at A15.
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All the same, Belgium's experience with its universal jurisdiction
criminal statute serves as a cautionary tale. In 1993, Belgium added
to its penal code a provision criminalizing "certain violations of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, regardless
of where such crimes were committed. ' 25 7 In 1999, Belgium amended
the statute to include genocide and crimes against humanity. 258 This
amendment also provided that state officials were not immune from
prosecution. 259 As one scholar has put it, Belgium's statute providing
"universal jurisdiction for human rights abuses ... was the broadest
in the crimes it covered and its lack of any required link between the
suspect, victims, or events, on the one hand, and Belgium, on the
2 60
other."
A number of cases came before Belgian courts under this statute.
Least controversially, the government tried two Rwandan nuns and
two Rwandan men for their roles in the nation's genocide. 261 The
defendants were each convicted and sentenced to prison terms of
between twelve and twenty years. 262 Then, in 2001, twenty-three
survivors of the 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra
and Shatila camps by Lebanese militiamen filed a criminal complaint
against Ariel Sharon based on provisions of Belgian criminal
procedure allowing victims to initiate cases before an investigating
judge. 263 Soon thereafter, a group of Israelis and Belgians filed a
complaint against Yasir Arafat. 264 Victims ultimately filed criminal
complaints against, among others, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein,
Abuldaye Yerodia (former Foreign Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Congo), and Hashemi Rafsanjani (former President of
265
Iran).
Before long, the Belgian statute came under attack on several
fronts. In October 2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) filed
266
a case against Belgium in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
It argued that the arrest warrant issued by a Belgian judge against
Yerodia in April 2000 was illegal. 267 In February 2002, the ICJ held
that the arrest warrant was inconsistent with Yerodia's immunity as

257.
Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 888, 889 (2003).
258.
Id.
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
Id. at 889-90.
264.
Id.
265. Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
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foreign affairs minister when the warrant was issued. 268 Although
the court decided the case on sovereign immunity grounds, universal
jurisdiction played a prominent role in the five separate opinions and
269
three dissents.
In June 2002, a Belgian appeals court held that Sharon and
Amos Yaron (the Israeli general responsible for the Beirut sector in
1982) could not be tried because they were not physically present in
Belgium. 270 In February 2003, however, Belgium's highest court, the
Cour de Cassation, overruled the appeals court and held that the
2 71
presence of the accused was unnecessary under Belgian law.
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the customary international law
principle of immunity for sitting heads of state and governments and
dismissed the case against Sharon. 2 72 The Court allowed the case
In response, Israel withdrew its
against Yaron to proceed.
273
ambassador to Belgium.
The decisive blow to the statute came in March 2003 when seven
Iraqi families requested an investigation of former U.S. President
George H. W. Bush, Vice President and former Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney, Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and retired General Norman
Schwarzkopf for their alleged commission of war crimes during the
1991 Gulf War. 274 Secretary Powell acknowledged that the United
States had chided Belgium: "We have cautioned our Belgian
colleagues that they need to be very careful about this kind of effort,
this kind of legislation, because it makes it hard for us to go places
that put you at such easy risk. '275 Lamenting that the criminal law

268.
Id.; see also Marius Emberland, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 96 AM. J. INT L L. 677 (2002); Sarah C.
Rispin, Implications of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet
Precedent: A Setback For International Human Rights Litigation?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
527, 528 (2002) (stating that incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs are immune from
criminal suit abroad, notwithstanding allegations of having committed "war crimes" or
"crimes against humanity").
269.
Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), No. 121 (I.C.J.
Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org (follow "Decisions," source is located
under the "2002" heading). [hereinafter Arrest Warrant].
270.
Ratner, supra note 257, at 890.
271.
Id.; see also H.S.A v. S.A., No. P.02.1139.F (Ct. of Cassation of Belg., Feb.
12, 2003), translated in 42 I..L.M. 596, 598 (2003) (indictment of Sharon, Yaron, and
others).
272.
H.S.A. v. S.A., No. P.02.1139.F at 599.
273.
Marc Perelman, Israel Seeks to Counter Belgian 'War Crimes' Ruling,
FORWARD, Feb. 21, 2003, http:l/www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.02.21lnews6.html.
274.

RAMSEY CLARK ET AL., WAR CRIMES: A REPORT ON U.S. WAR CRIMES

AGAINST IRAQ (1992), available at http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-index.htm.
275.
US Chides Belgium Over Rights Laws, BBC NEWS, Mar. 19, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ifhi/world/europe/2863273.stm; see also Ratner, supra note 257,
at 890 ("Secretary Powell warned the Belgian government that Belgium was raising its
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was "being abused by opportunists" and that "Belgium must not
impose itself as the moral conscience of the world," Belgium's Foreign
2 76
Minister, Louis Michel, denounced the case.
In April 2003 and again in August 2003, the United States
threatened to withhold funding for a new NATO building in Belgium
or to forbid officials to travel to the country if further changes were
not made to the law. 277 Belgium caved and amended the law. The
version of the law that entered into force in August 2003 allowed
Belgian courts to hear cases involving war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide when the offenses are committed outside of
Belgium only if the defendant or victim is a citizen or resident of
Belgium. 278 In addition, it expressly barred cases against acting
heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and
individuals whose immunity is recognized by international law or by
a treaty to which Belgium is a party. 279 Finally, it strengthened the
role of the public prosecutor only when the victim is Belgian. 28 0 These
changes reined in Belgium's legislation to a point acceptable to the
United States and other powerful nations.
Canada will have to "walk the fine line" between irking its
neighbor to the south and holding the United States to lower
standards than the rest of the world. The latter part of the equation
is essential, because to borrow again Michael Ignatieffs words, "the
crisis of human rights relates first of all to our failure to be
consistent-to apply criteria to the strong as well as to the
weak. .. ,281 These "problems of consistency have consequences for
the legitimacy of human rights standards themselves. For example,
non-Western cultures look at the partial and inconsistent way we
enforce and apply human rights principles and conclude that there is
'28 2
something wrong with the principles themselves.
Another difficult question will be how to avoid irking the United
States while still holding it accountable when private plaintiffs decide
what cases to bring. Who or what will serve as a filter? Is a filter
necessary or good? Belgium's experience begs the question of whether

status as a diplomatic capital and the host for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) by allowing investigations of those who might visit Belgium.").
276.
Malvina Halberstam, Belgium's Universal JurisdictionLaw: Vindication of
InternationalJustice or Pursuitof Politics?,25 CARDOzo L. REV. 247, 251 (2003).
277.
See Ratner, supra note 257, at 891.
278.
Id. (citing Loi relative aux violations grave du droit humanitaire, Aug. 5,
2003, M.B., Aug. 7, 2003, arts. 14-16; House Justice Committee Report, Belg. Parl.
Doc. 51 0103/003, at 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/
51/0103/51K0103003.pdf).
279.
Ratner, supra note 257, at 891.
280.
Id.
281.

IGNATIEFF, supra note 145, at 47.

282.

Id. at 48.
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a robust Canadian human rights tort system is realistic. It helps that
the United States also has broad tort legislation for human rights
violations. Nevertheless, the Belgian experience and Belgium's
ultimate formulation of its criminal statute seem to suggest that
Canadian legislators should take care to ground tort legislation for
human right violations in international law, both with respect to the
norms covered and jurisdictional and other limitations.

IV.

RECONCILING CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS
INTERNATIONALISM

A Canadian tort regime for human rights and humanitarian law
violations must find a balance between Canada's internationalism
(i.e., multilateralism and a penchant for the international rule of law)
and its desire to protect human rights. An aggressive stance on
human rights in other countries may be in tension with Canada's role
as a law abiding player in the international arena. Anne Marie
Slaughter and David Bosco's analysis of ATCA cases, discussed
above, merits contemplation in the Canadian context. They argue
that "American courts today are walking a fine line between
expanding a transnational legal system capable of enforcing
international law and engaging in a unilateral legal expansion that
will damage long-term U.S. interests. ' 28 4 Moreover, they acknowledge
that "the expansion of plaintiffs' power in U.S. courts looks quite
different from the perspective of other countries." 285 They wisely note
the juxtaposition of this increased involvement of U.S. courts in foreign
affairs with the continued American refusal to participate in bodies like
the International Criminal Court creates the image of a country happy
to haul foreign defendants into its own courts while stubbornly
resisting even the remote possibility that its own citizens might be
2 86
called to account.

Importantly, they contend that "[t]o have value, such [international
legal commitments] should apply equally at home and abroad." 287
Canada is on better footing than the United States with respect
to consistency. Canada, unlike the United States, is a member state
of the ICC. Therefore, far-reaching domestic tort legislation arguably
is an appropriate complement to Canada's commitment to
accountability for human rights in the international realm.
Nevertheless, pushing international human rights norms too far, or

284.
285.
286.
287.

Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 122, at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116.
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exercising jurisdiction or encroaching on sovereign immunity when
international law would not support it, renders Slaughter and Bosco's
concerns all the more applicable to Canada.
A. Jurisdictionand JurisdictionalImmunities
1. Universal Jurisdiction
To comport with Canada's pro-international-law stance, any
ATCA-style legislation should be grounded in international law
principles of jurisdiction. As the European Community (EC) argued
in Sosa,
in
order
to
respect
the
authority
of
States
and
organizations ... exercising their authority to regulate activities
occurring on their own territory, and hence to preserve international
relations, States must respect the limits imposed by international law
on the authority of any individual State to apply its laws beyond its
288
own territory.

Although normally "[c]ustomary and conventional international law
do not set down any general rules placing restrictions on the
jurisdiction of domestic courts in civil matters,"289 arguably due to the
punitive nature of ATCA-style cases, there must be a valid basis for
29 0
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction in these cases.
Claims to prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction may be
founded on at least six bases: territorial principle, nationality
principle, passive personality principle, protective principle, universal
principle, and agreement. 29 1 It is well-established under international
law that "States have jurisdiction to prescribe when there is a nexus
between the conduct the State purports to regulate and the
regulating State." This proposition is least controversial when the
nexus is based on the "territorial principle," 292 the "nationality
principle" 29 3 or the "protection principle. ' 294 International law allows
the exercise of universal jurisdiction, which "permits States to
exercise jurisdiction over matters of universal concern even when the

288. Brief for the European Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), available at 2004
WL 177036, at *4 (Jan. 23, 2004) [hereinafter EC Amicus Brief].
289. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8,at 508.
290. Id. at 509.
291.
Id. at 515-19.
292. The territorial principle refers to the regulation of conduct that occurs on a
state's territory. EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *13.
293. The nationality principle refers to the regulation of a state's nationals. Id.
294. The protective principle refers to regulation of the "conduct of non-nationals
who are outside their territory when that conduct is directed against the security of the
regulating State." Id.
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State exercising jurisdiction has no connection with the case," 29 5 only
when certain types of norms are involved.
Jurisdictional self-restraint is essential: "if domestic courts are to
be legitimate participants in the formulation of substantive
international law doctrine, they must exercise self-restraint in
asserting jurisdiction over international law claims." 296 In the Sosa
case, the EC argued that "the subject matter of the statute should be
defined by reference to the limits set forth by international law of the
U.S.'s jurisdiction to prescribe." 297 It maintained that "when
jurisdiction to prescribe is based on territory, nationality, or
protection, the Alien Tort Statute may be interpreted to incorporate
the full body of the law of nations. ' 298 However, "where the US's
jurisdiction to prescribe is based on universal jurisdiction, the ATS
should be interpreted to reach only that conduct subject to such
jurisdiction." 299 In essence, the EC argues that what can be covered
30 0
depends on the asserted basis for jurisdiction.
As discussed below, Canadian legislation should apply universal
jurisdiction to a restricted category of cases and "only when the
claimant would face a denial of justice in any State that could
exercise jurisdiction on a traditional basis, such as territory or
nationality. ' 30 1 As the EC explained in its brief in Sosa, although
"[i]nternational law sanctions universal criminal jurisdiction in order
to end impunity for violations of the most fundamental norms of
international law, such as the prohibitions against genocide, torture,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity ...the existence and scope
of universal civil jurisdiction are not well established." 302 Indeed,
"[t]o the extent that universal civil jurisdiction is recognized, it
applies only to a narrow category of cases. Any exercise of universal
civil jurisdiction should also be limited in accord with its

295.
Id. at *14.
296.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1137.
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *i,*4. The Restatement (Third) of
297.
Foreign Relations Law recognizes five bases for extending jurisdiction beyond a
nation's borders: territoriality, nationality, the protective principle, passive personality,
and universality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402, 404 (1987).

"Universal jurisdiction permits States to exercise jurisdiction over matters of universal
concern even when the State exercising jurisdiction has no connection with the case."
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *14.
298.
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *1.
299.
Id. at *ii.
300.
Id. at *19. The EC also notes that "[i]nternational law is also unsettled as
to the correspondence between the categories of conduct regulable as a matter of
universal criminal jurisdiction and those regulable as a matter of universal civil
jurisdiction." Id.
301.
Id. at *4-5.
Id.
302.
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rationale." 30 3 At a minimum though, international law lends support
to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in cases involving torture,
30 4
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Support for extending universal jurisdiction from the criminal to
the civil realm can be found not only in U.S. jurisprudence, but also
in the decisions of international tribunals, the Restatement, and
other secondary materials. In his concurrence in the Alvarez-Machain
case, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer stated that the similarities
between criminal and civil proceedings in many jurisdictions mean
that if universal jurisdiction is recognized for certain norms in the
30 5
criminal context, it should also be recognized in the civil context.
Justice Breyer noted:
The fact that this procedural consensus exists [viz. a consensus that
universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of certain universally
condemned behaviour which includes torture] suggests the recognition
of universal jurisdiction in respect of a limited set of norms is consistent
with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation's
courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such
cases will not significantly threaten the practical harmony that comity
306
principles seek to protect.

In the ICTY case Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judge Cassese remarked
that a victim of torture could pursue a civil claim against a state in
the courts of another state. 30 7 Three ICJ judges in the separate
opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, saw in the ATCA "the beginnings
of a very broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction" in the civil
sphere," but noted that the United States' assertion of this form of
'308
jurisdiction had "not attracted the approbation of States generally.
The Restatement states that "[i]n general, jurisdiction on the basis of
universal interests has been exercised in the form of criminal law, but
international law does not preclude the application of non-criminal

303.
Id.
304.
Id. at *16 (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE
EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES
5-8 (2000) (including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture) and
citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (including genocide, war
crimes, piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft)); see also The Princeton
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
(2001), http://www.princeton.edu-lapa/
univejur.pdf.
305.
Sosa v. Alvaraz-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 772 (2004); see EC Amicus Brief,
supra note 288, at *21-22 (noting that the civil-criminal distinction breaks down in a
lot of systems, particularly those where victims of crimes can recover monetary
compensation as part of the prosecution of the wrongdoer); see also Stephens, supra
note 28, at 18-20; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 68.
306.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 772.
307.
Prosecutor v. Furundzjija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
155 (Dec.
10, 1998), translatedin 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
308.
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *18.
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law on this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or
restitution for victims of piracy." 309 Similarly leaving the door open
for a civil application of universal jurisdiction, the International Law
Association's Report on Universal Jurisdiction remarked that the
United States has had "some success" in exercising universal
jurisdiction in the civil context. 310 The secondary literature is divided
on the propriety of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the civil
311
context.
Even Chibundu, an opponent of the ATCA, seems to concede that
universal jurisdiction could attach to violations of international
human rights norms in some contexts:
The doctrinal development of the concept-essentially a creature of
customary international law-is not (and should not be) frozen in time;
and in particular, it should be expanded to include civil actions that
arise from the violation of international human rights norms. This
argument appears particularly strong where no superior alternative
forum is immediately available to the civil claimants. Furthermore, in
the absence of such an expansion, meritorious claims might go
312
uncompensated, and wrongful conduct will go unpunished.

Thus, where there is no superior alternative forum, the argument for
universal jurisdiction grows stronger. It is worth recalling though
that universal jurisdiction is a form of subject matter jurisdiction. As
discussed below, cases brought in Canadian courts would still have to
meet the real and substantial connection test for courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over defendants.
2. Sovereign immunity
The inquiry does not end with jurisdiction. Courts must still
determine whether a jurisdictional immunity exists. As the ICJ has
explained:
[A]lthough various international conventions on the prevention and
punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of
prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their
criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects
immunities under customary international law, including those of
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts
of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction
313
under these conventions.

309.
Id. at *17.
310.
Id.; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404, cmt. B.
311.
Compare Jason Jarvis, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under
Extraterritorialityand the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671 (2003), with
Kenneth Roth, The Case for UniversalJurisdiction,80 FOREIGN AFF. 150 (2001).
312.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1133.
313.
Arrest Warrant, supra note 269, 10.
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It bears noting that "the principle of sovereign immunity is not
broad
founded on any technical rules of law: it is founded on
' 314
considerations of public policy, international law and comity.
Canadian tort legislation, whether enacted on a federal or
provincial level, ought to be accompanied by clarification of the scope
of immunity for human rights abusers in the SIA. Canada's SIA,
which codified Canada's move from the notion of absolute immunity
to that of restrictive immunity, 3 15 provides that "[e]xcept as provided

by this Act, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of any
court in Canada. '316 The exceptions to the Act are for waiver of
immunity, commercial activities, and death and property damage
3 17
that occurs in Canada.
There is ever-increasing support for the proposition that state
officials are not immune from cases based on violations of jus cogens
norms. Perhaps the most famous example of the erosion of sovereign
immunity appeared in the Pinochet case, in which the High Court of
the United Kingdom held that former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet was not immune from prosecution. 3 18 Although three judges
in the Pinochet case expressly noted that immunity would apply in
civil proceedings against a state for torture committed in that
state, 3 19 one has now changed his mind. 320 Recently, the U.K. Court

314.
Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, 12004] EWCA Civ. 1394,
10 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), available at http://www.hrothgar.co.ukYAWS/
reps/04a1394.htm.
315.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 286-87.
316.
State Immunity Act, R.S.C., c. S-18, § 3(1) (2005) (Can.). The Act defines
"foreign state" as "(a) any sovereign or other head of the foreign state or of any political
subdivision of the foreign state while acting as such in a public capacity, (b) any
government of the foreign state or of any political subdivision of the foreign state,
including any of its departments, and any agency of the foreign state, and (c) any
political subdivision of the foreign state .
Id. § 2.
I...
317.
Id. § 4(1); id. § 5 ("A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a
court in any proceedings that relate to any commercial activity of the foreign state.");
id. § 6 ("A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court in any
proceedings that relate to (a) any death or personal or bodily injury, or (b)any damage
to or loss of property that occurs in Canada.).
318.
Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.). Pinochet was ultimately deemed not fit to stand trial
for health reasons. See id.
319.
See Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675,
91; see also 1 LASSA
OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 545 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992).
320.
Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA Civ 1394,
128, [2005] Q.B. 699,
128 (U.K. Ct. App.), available at http://www.hrothgar.co.ukl
YAWS/reps/04a1394.htm (L. Phillips, concurring).
On reflection I have concluded that the argument does not run in relation to
civil proceedings either. If civil proceedings are brought against individuals for
acts of torture in circumstances where the state is immune from suit ratione
personae, there can be no suggestion that the state is vicariously liable. It is the
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of Appeal held that state officials who commit torture should not be
protected from lawsuits by the U.K.'s SIA. Lord Mance stated: "It can
no longer be appropriate to give blanket effect to a foreign state's
claim to state immunity ... in respect of a state official alleged to
have committed acts of systematic torture."3 2 1 In the United States,
although the TVPA "was intended to preserve FSIA immunity for
foreign state governmental agencies, it assumes that 'sovereign
be an available defense' to a suit
immunity would not generally
3 22
officials."
individual
against
Some have argued that, under existing Canadian law, even
states can be sued for violations of certain human rights norms, 323
but this argument has had little success in the courts. The Ontario
Court of Appeal declined to read into the SIA a waiver of immunity or
an implied exception for torture in Bouzari.3 24 The court stated that

personal responsibility of the individuals, not that of the state, which is in
issue. The state is not indirectly impleaded by the proceedings..
321.
Id. 1 92. It is notable though that, like the Ontario courts in Bouzari, the
High Court did not address the issue of jurisdiction. Id. Indeed, it flagged that one of
the reasons to refuse to apply sovereign immunity as a bar to suits against officials is
97. Lord Mance
that jurisdictional principles would still have to be satisfied. See id.
explained:
[W]here there is no adequate remedy in the state where the systematic torture
occurs, it might well in my view be regarded as disproportionate to maintain a
blanket refusal of recourse to the civil courts of another European jurisdiction,
the courts of which would under their ordinary domestic rules possess and
(apart from immunity) be able to exercise jurisdiction.
Id. Lord Mance also noted that jurisdictional hurdles were likely to be a key reason
that England would not "become a forum of choice for the bringing of claims for torture
committed throughout the world." Id.
322.
Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1287 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 34 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85-86).
This argument can be framed in terms of waiver of immunity or in terms of
323.
implied exceptions to the SIA. These arguments have also not fared well in other
jurisdictions. See Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179-85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for implied waiver of FSIA in cases of jus cogens violations).
Challenges to the UK's SIA in the European Court of Human Rights based on their
alleged infringement with the right of access to a Court, which has been held to form
part of Article 6's due process guarantee, have also failed. See International Law
Association Human Rights Committee, Report on Civil Actions in the English Courts
for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad, Eur. H. R. L.R. 2001, 129-166 n.25
(citing Al-Adsani v. U.K. (Application no. 35763/97), Fogarty v. U.K. (Application no.
37112/97), and McElinney v. Ireland (Application no. 31253/96) (declared admissible on
Mar. 1, 2000), and contrasting Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, July 20, 2000 rev'd in (1995)
65 B.Y.I.L. 491).
324.
In Bouzari, the plaintiffs levied a multi-pronged attack on the SIA before
the Superior Court of Ontario. They argued that the case fell into three different
exceptions set out in the Act: the commercial activities, tort, and the penal law
2 (O.S.C.J. May 1,
exceptions. See Bouzari v. Iran, [2002] O.J. 1264 QUICKLAW
2002 LOWER COURT'S RULING). In the alternative, they argued that another
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neither treaty law nor customary international law gave Bouzari his
desired civil remedy:
Both under customary international law and international treaty there
is today a balance struck between the condemnation of torture as an
international crime against humanity and the principle that states
must treat each other as equals not to be subjected to each other's
jurisdiction. It would be inconsistent with this balance to provide a civil
remedy against a foreign state for torture committed abroad. 325

The Bouzari court left open the possibility that international law on
state immunity could change with time:
In the future, perhaps as the international human rights movement
gathers greater force, this balance may change, either through the
domestic legislation of states or by international treaty. However, this
is not a change to be effected by a domestic court adding an exception to
the SIA that is not there, or seeing a widespread state practice that
326
does not exist today.

Wendy Adams considered the viability of implied exceptions to
domestic state immunity statutes, generally and in Canada, and, like
the Bouzari Court, concluded that the judicial creation of an implied
exception would be impermissible judicial legislation.3 27 She reasoned
that as a result of Canada's "transformationist" approach to
international law, whereby implementing legislation is necessary to
make international treaties enforceable in Canada, legislation would
328
be necessary to address exceptions to immunity under the SIA.
If Canada wants to boldly go where Belgium has gone before and
push the frontiers of international law on immunity (and likely the
patience of its influential neighbor), Parliament could tackle this

exception to the immunity should be read into the Act to permit a civil action for
torture. See id. In support of their argument for an additional exception for torture
suits, Plaintiffs argued (1) "that Canada has an obligation to provide victims of torture
with a civil remedy by the terms of the [Torture] Convention," and (2) that "an
exception to the doctrine of state immunity for civil actions for damages for torture
must be read into the Act in order that Canada not be in violation of international law"
due to the jus cogens status of the prohibition on torture. See id. 40. The court held
that the case fit none of the existing exceptions to the SIA and refused to read another
exception into the SIA for torture. Id. 7 21, 29, 34, 89. It concluded that Iran was
protected from suit by the SIA. Id. 77 89, 90. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the
lower court's decision. Bouzari v. Iran, 71 O.R.3d 675 (2004).
325.
Bouzari, 71 O.R.3d at T 95.
326.
Id.

327.
See Wendy Adams, In Search of a Defence of the Transnational Human
Rights Paradigm:May Jus Cogens Norms be Invoked to Create Implied Exceptions in
Domestic State Immunity Statutes, in SCOTT, supra note 7, at 262. Adams contends
that Baker v. Canada, which allowed for a "contextual approach" to statutory
interpretation based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, would be more
difficult to apply in the context of torture, because the terms of the CAT more vague.
Id. at 257-58.
328.
Id. at 255.
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issue legislatively by adding an exception to SIA. 329 The United
States has adopted this approach in the context of terrorism. The
U.S. Congress amended the FSIA to allow suits against nations the
Executive Branch branded "state sponsor[s] of terrorism."3 30 But in
adopting this approach, Canada would be putting itself on icy footing
in international law.
Although, as discussed above, there seems to be increasing
authority for the proposition that state officials (other than acting
heads of state and foreign ministers) seeking immunity ratione
materiae331 are not protected by sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is intact with respect to states, acting heads of state, and a
small group of state agents, including foreign ministers on the basis
of immunity ratione personae.332 The ICJ held in Congo v. Belgium

329.
One proposal put forth by the New Democratic Party is for an amendment
of the SIA whereby, torture, as well as commerce, would fall outside the bounds of state
immunity. Another alternative is to expand an existing exception to state immunity.
Section 6 of the SIA provides: "A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a
court in any proceedings that relate to (a) any death or personal or bodily injury, or (b)
any damage to or loss of property that occurs in Canada." State Immunity Act, R.S.C.
1985, ch. s-18, s-6. Parliament could just add the language "wherever they have
occurred" to (a).
330.
See BRADLEY, supra note 34, at 463 (citing Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act § 1605(a)(7), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1602-11 (1994)).
331.
Donald Macdougal sets out a good explanation on immunity ratione
personae. He explains:
In international law, the concept of immunity ratione personae provides
immunity from all legal process in foreign national courts upon a person who is
head of state or in a small group of important state agents, during their term of
office. This type of immunity covers all crimes, including international crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is an absolute
immunity; an immunity that not only protects the state agent acting on behalf
of the state but also renders him or her completely immune from any foreign
jurisdiction regardless of whether the act is official or private. As soon as they
leave their post, immunity ratione personae ceases and only immunity ratione
materiae for official acts remains.
Donald V. Macdougal, Torture in Canadian Criminal Law, 24 CR-ART 74 (6th Ser.
2005).
332.
Macdougal likewise gives a good summary of immunity ratione materiae:
The doctrine of immunity ratione materiae confers immunity in foreign
national courts concerning the conduct of state business while in office, even
after leaving office. It concerns the official acts of a state official, the acts
performed in pursuit of his or her official tasks. In Pinochet, the majority of the
House of Lords held that this immunity did apply to Pinochet for acts done
before Spain (which was requesting extradition of Pinochet for torture charges
in Spain), Chile (the locus of the acts) and the UK (the locus of Pinochet) had
ratified the Convention Against Torture, but immunity did not apply for acts
after that ratification, when the acts were systematic and widespread and part
of state policy.
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that the Congo's foreign minister was immune from prosecution in
foreign courts while in office. 3 33 The Court noted "that in
international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and
consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State,
such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States,
both civil and criminal." Further, the Court found nothing in State
practice or in the rules or decisions of any of the international
33 4
criminal tribunals that would cause it to deviate from this rule.
Similarly, in the Al-Adsani case, the European Court of Human
Rights explained that
[n]otwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in
international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international
instruments, judicial authorities, or other materials before it any firm
basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no
longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State
33 5
where acts of torture are alleged.

B. Conduct Covered
Canadian legislators must then choose between, on the one
hand, broad language that acknowledges the variety of forms of
human rights abuses condemned by the international community and
the changing nature of customary international law and, on the other,
more specific language that heightens clarity and jurisdictional
legitimacy. To further Canada's commitments to internationalism,
the rule of law, and human rights, Canadian tort legislation should
address as many human rights violations as it can, consistent with
international law.
Just as the EC argued of U.S. legislation in Sosa, Canadian tort
legislation should cover "only truly international standards - that is,
standards that govern matters 'of mutual, and not merely several,
concern' of States. '336 In Sosa, the EC took the example of murder:
"[A]lthough murder may be universally proscribed by States in their
domestic law, it should not provide a cause of action under the statute
unless and until it reaches the level of international concern-in
other words, unless it occurs in such circumstances or on such a scale

333.
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 2002).
51, 58.
334.
Id.
335.
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 752, 61.
336.
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *8-9. Further, the EC argued that "the
substantive standards imposed by the [ATCA] should be defined by reference to
international law." Id. at *3. In particular, the EC contended that (1) U.S. courts
should apply international law rigorously "to determine the conduct that may give rise
to a tort in violation of the law of nations .... " Id. at *3-4.
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that it would qualify as a war crime, a crime against humanity, or
337
genocide."
The option that places due emphasis on international law and
still leaves the most room for its evolution would be to provide
jurisdiction and a cause of action for jus cogens violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law. The minimum
human rights norms set out in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law 338 are:
(i)

Genocide;

(i)

Slavery or slave trade;

(iii)
(iv)

Murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment;

(v)

Prolonged arbitrary detention;

(vi)
(vii)

Systematic racial discrimination; and
A consistent pattern of gross violations
3 39
recognized human rights.

of internationally

CAHWCA lays out the violations of international humanitarian law
that Canada has chosen to condemn-war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. 340 It would likely be useful to courts for any
such new legislation to include a list of norms that have reached jus
cogens status, such as those set out in the Restatement and in
CAHWCA. Although this approach sacrifices flexibility, the benefits
of clarity probably outweigh the drawbacks. Further, if international
law grows to encompass more of these norms, the legislation could
always be amended to reflect this change.
In the case of torture, the legislation should maintain the
definitions that exist in the criminal code. Currently, Canadian
criminal law has different definitions for torture depending on
whether the torture alleged is torture as an ordinary criminal
violation (based on the CAT), torture as a crime against humanity, or
torture as a war crime. 34 1 The first requires "the involvement of a
state official and the necessity of a purpose for the infliction of pain

337.
338.
academics
within and
339.

Id. at *9.
"The Restatement is an unofficial compendium of existing law prepared by
in the United States. It is generally considered highly persuasive both
outside the United States." INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8,at 813.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987).

Beth Van

Schaack has set out language of minimum human rights norms broader than that of
the Restatement in her article on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, which
could serve as another useful model. See Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 159-60.
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24, amended
340.
by 2001 S.C., ch. 32, §§ 59-61; 2001 S.C., ch. 34, § 36 (Can.).
Macdougal, supranote 331.
341.
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and suffering. '34 2 The second two require neither the involvement of
a state official nor a particular purpose for the infliction of pain and
suffering. 343 Torture as a crime against humanity, however, requires
that the acts be "committed against a civilian population or any
identifiable group" and be "part of a widespread or systematic
attack. '344 Torture as a war crime requires that the torture have
taken place in the context of an armed conflict. 345 These
requirements in Canadian criminal law on torture reflect
international law, including international criminal law and the
Convention on Torture,3 46 and should be preserved in civil legislation.
Finally, tying tort legislation to the jus cogens norms is beneficial
for the purposes of jurisdictional legitimacy, particularly if plaintiffs
in Canada hope to assert universal jurisdiction over tortfeasors. As
discussed above, Canadian courts can only exercise universal
jurisdiction legitimately over a certain set of norms. The assertion of
universal jurisdiction is most valid with respect to jus cogens norms.
If plaintiffs wished to sue for violations of norms that fall short of jus
cogens violations where universal jurisdiction is accepted under
international law, such as kidnapping or arbitrary detention that is
not prolonged, then they would have to look elseWhere in Canadian
law and ground their claims in a jurisdictional basis other than
347
universal jurisdiction.
C. Non-State Actors as Possible Defendants
The applicability of tort legislation to non-state actors is a
critical issue with respect to both the effectiveness and the potential
resistance to any tort legislation for human rights violations. Thus,
the rigorous application of international law with respect to the
actors who may be found liable is also necessary.3 48 As the EC noted
in Sosa, for example, "[C]ourts should recognize that only a subset of
norms that make up customary international law apply to non-state
actors, such as corporations." 349 Although "non-state actors may be
liable for genocide, war crimes, and piracy . . .torture, summary
execution, and prolonged arbitrary detention do not violate the law of

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *14-15.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *4.
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nations unless they are committed by state officials or under color of
law."

3 50

This framework, however, still leaves room for holding non-state
actors liable for their complicity in the violation of norms not directly
applicable to them by state actors. 351 For example, the Ninth Circuit
and other U.S. courts have examined case law from Nuremberg, the
ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to
determine the international law standard applicable to a claim that a
defendant in an ATCA case had aided and abetted the violation of a
norm that fell within the scope of the statute but was directly
applicable only to state actors.3 52 Although it may not be necessary
for legislation to clarify this point, ultimately courts should be guided
by international law in determining whether the non-state actors can
be held liable indirectly for violations of human rights and
35 3
humanitarian law violations.
D. ExhaustionRequirement
A position in keeping with Canada's dual role as defender of
human rights and law-abiding international player would be to
provide universal jurisdiction, but to impose an explicit exhaustion
requirement. Even enthusiastic proponents of the ATCA, like
Stephens, agree that
[t]he need to invoke international law to address 'domestic' violence
implies a breakdown of domestic legal remedies. Were the local system
willing and able to address the violence by providing timely
investigation, punishment and redress to the victim, the violence would
probably not rise to the level of an international law violation.
International law is triggered where State officials commit and condone
violent acts, or where the State violates its obligation to prevent and
354
punish abuses.

Id. at *11 (citing, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-46 (2d
350.
Cir. 1995) (discussing torture and summary execution); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
972 (1993) (discussing torture); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 79495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)
(discussing torture); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995)
(discussing torture, summary execution, disappearance, and arbitrary detention);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (causing
disappearances); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(discussing torture, summary execution and prolonged arbitrary detention)).
351.
See id. at *11.
352.
Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 395 F.3d 932, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Doe v.
Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1332 (N.D.Cal. 2004).
EC Amicus Brief, supranote 288, at *11-12.
353.
Stephens, supra note 76, at 593.
354.
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Notably, the clearer and less controversial of the two U.S. tort
statutes, the TVPA, has an explicit exhaustion requirement. 355 The
EC explained in its brief in the Sosa case that the TVPA's exhaustion
requirement "derive[d] from a rule of general international law
requiring that, before a claim may be asserted in an international
forum, the claimant must have exhausted remedies in the domestic
legal system. '356 The reasoning behind the rule is that states must
provide "an opportunity to prevent, correct, or remedy conduct that
would otherwise constitute a violation of international law. '35 7 In
many of these human rights cases, however, victims cannot use
domestic forums. Under international law, however, they would be
excused of the exhaustion requirement when "local redress is
unavailable or obviously futile. '358 The EC concludes: "In a similar
fashion, an exercise of universal civil jurisdiction should be
predicated on a showing that there was no reasonable prospect of
redress in either a State exercising jurisdiction on a traditional basis
or through an international mechanism." 359
An explicit exhaustion requirement would bring Canadian
legislation in line, on its face, with international law, address
concerns about legal imperialism, and promote the growth of
meaningful remedies elsewhere. Such was the aim of the exhaustion
requirement of the TVPA. 36 0 The plaintiffs in Sosa argued that the
ATCA had an implied exhaustion requirement due to the exhaustion
361
requirement imposed by international law.
Moreover, requiring plaintiffs to exhaust remedies, where
possible, with states that have jurisdiction on traditional bases would
make Canadian tort legislation on gross violations of human rights

355.
note 38, at
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(b) (1994); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
15-16.
See EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
With the TVPA, Congress sought

to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need to provide redress for
victims of fragrant human rights abuses, considering that judicial protection is
often least effective in those countries where abuses are most common, and, on
the other, the need to ensure that United States courts would not intrude upon
cases that could be more appropriately handled by the courts where the alleged
torture or killing occurred, the need to avoid exposing United States courts to
unnecessary burdens, and the need to encourage the development of
meaningful remedies in other countries.
EC Amicus Brief, supra note 288, at *23 (citing Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) and citing
H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 1, 3 (Nov. 25, 1991)).
361.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 63-64.
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consistent with its criminal legislation implementing the ICC statute.
At the heart of the ICC is the "principle of complementarity whereby
the Court is subsidiary or complementary to national courts: these
courts enjoy priority in the exercise of jurisdiction except under
special circumstances, when the ICC is entitled to take over and
assert its jurisdiction."362 This approach was based not only on
practical limits on the number of cases the court could handle, but
also on the "intent to respect state sovereignty as much as
possible." 363 Thus, only where the courts with a nexus to the
underlying events offer no meaningful remedy should a plaintiff be
able to pursue a tort suit in Canadian courts. The exhaustion
determination also should be made with sensitivity to and a degree of
3 64
deference to local approaches.
The absence of prosecutors or other government officials as a
filter to decide which cases to bring will not cause litigation to spiral
out of control. Although in civil cases there is no role for prosecutors
or other officials 365 who could "take into account such considerations
of public policy and international comity as they deem
appropriate,"3 66 there still is a role for judges. Arguably, prosecutors
may take executive policy into account more than judges do. As
discussed above, however, this filter of cases through the policy
concerns of the executive is often not a good thing.
Sticky issues related to exhaustion persist, but they are
surmountable. One is whether tort suits should be permitted when
the country in which the acts occurred has dealt with the acts via a
truth commission. It is highly debated whether truth commissions
preclude criminal or civil suits. In some nations, such as Sierra
Leone, the view that a truth commission did not bar criminal suits
prevailed. 367 Yet some truth commissions, such as South Africa's

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (2003).
362.
Id.
363.
364.
See Halberstam, supra note 276, at 266.
For example, in criminal cases for torture in Canada, "if the accused is not
365.
a Canadian citizen, the Attorney General of Canada must consent to the prosecution."
Macdougal, supra note 331.
EC Amicus Brief, supranote 288, at *20.
366.
367.
Indeed, a hybrid international-domestic criminal court was set up by the
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations after the creation of the Truth
Commission. See generally The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org.
The Special Court
is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. Currently,
eleven persons associated with all three of the country's former warring
factions stand indicted by the Special Court. They are charged with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Specifically, the charges include murder, rape,
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which gives amnesty to those
who apply for it and who show sufficient remorse, are embraced as
alternatives. 3 68 Would civil suits disrupt a delicate balance? As
Chibundu has put it, South Africa's "experiment may not work, but it
seems not only presumptuous but solely heuristic to suppose that the
customary international law doctrines of punishment developed in
United States courts and which, under South African law, thus
becomes part of their law, should foreclose the capacity of South
Africa to innovate in this area. '3 69 The U.S. Supreme Court appeared
to struggle with this issue. At oral argument, one Justice commented:
Apartheid is a terrible thing, but according to the government,... the
President of South Africa, has told the United States that the judicial
efforts to give compensation to victims are interfering with his efforts to
build a democratic South Africa. Now, if I have to choose between these
two I'd say democratic South Africa, protective of human rights has it
370
all over compensating the victims even though that's terrible.

Often related to the issue of truth commissions is the effect of
amnesties granted in the place where the acts occurred on the
viability of tort suits in Canada. Amnesties seem to have fallen under
disfavor recently. For example, the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission condemned Chile's blanket amnesty by saying that it
deprived individuals of "their right to due process for their just
complaints against persons who had committed excesses and acts of
barbarism against them. ' 371 One chamber of the ICTY has also
chimed in on this issue:
The [United Nations Human Rights Committee] Committee has noted
that some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture.
Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to
investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their
jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States
may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy,

extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, sexual slavery,
conscription of children into an armed force, and attacks on United Nations
peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, among others. Indictments against
two other persons were withdrawn in December 2003 due to the deaths of the
accused.
Id.
368,
Chibundu, supranote 33, at 1144.
369. Id.
370,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 54.
371.
Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 36/96,
OEA/ser.LJV./II.95, doc. 7 rev. 156, 110 (1997).
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possible.372

and such full rehabilitation

as may be

Yet there need not be an all or nothing approach to truth
commissions or amnesties. Coming from a restorative justice
perspective, Jennifer Llewellyn advocates that courts attempt to
distinguish between just and unjust amnesties. 373 She notes that the
most obvious xample of such a distinction would be between blanket
amnesties and individualized amnesty provisions, such as those
provided in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and
374
favors the latter over the former.
A broad view of justice is advisable in the determination whether
local approaches are sufficient to satisfy an exhaustion requirement
and thus bar jurisdiction in Canadian courts. To borrow again
Chibundu's words:
[t]he point of particular importance ... is not whether they successfully
punish wrongdoers. Although fashionable, it is a mistake to equate
"justice" with "punishment." What is important is that the experience of
trying to come to grips with the interplay of criminality and politics
within the particular society is one that shapes the structures and
institutions of that society, not the least of which are the judiciary and
375
related institutions.

E. Forum Non Conveniens
Whether explicit in the legislation or not, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens should inform courts' decisions about whether or not
to accept a case based on violations of international human rights
law. 376 In Canada, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a flexible

372.
See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, n.172 (Dec.
10, 1998) (citing Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 Rev. 1 at 30 (1994)).
373.
Jennifer Llewellyn, Just Amnesty and PrivateInternationalLaw, in SCOTT,
supra note 7, at 567-600. She explains that,
underlying the various practical forms restorative justice may take are various
common commitments: to restoration over retribution, reintegration over
isolation; to understanding the community as an integral part in the creation
and solution of social conflict, with a concomitant acknowledgement that the
focus is always broader than the individual or the immediately interpersonal;
to looking at the implications for the future of a wrong and of proposed means
of redress; and to bringing together all those with a stake in the development of
that future.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
374.
375.
Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1146.
376.
Unlike the United States, Canada does not have the limiting political
question doctrine. Compare Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441,
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one. The test boils down to the question whether there is another
more appropriate forum. 377 In many human rights cases, this
doctrine does not come into play, because the otherwise more
appropriate forum, such as Iran in the Bouzari case, is not a realistic
378
alternative.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens may operate to assuage
Chibundu's imperialist fears-if a local court is a viable and more
appropriate alternative, it' ought to be used. Of course, the
requirement does not do away with the fundamental chicken and egg
problem that exists with both the exhaustion and forum non
conveniens doctrines-how do you develop capacity in local courts if
you take away all the cases that would give them the chance to
exercise that capacity? Encouraging the development and strength of
local judicial institutions is essential and a project worthy of
Canadian time and resources. It should not be used, however, as an
excuse to allow gross violations of human rights norms to go
unpunished.
F. BalancingApproach
Ultimately, Canadian courts will have discretion in determining
whether the hurdles set up by Canadian legislation and by ordinary
rules of civil litigation bar individual suits. In determining whether a
claim for gross violations of human rights norms is allowed to
proceed, courts must consider a variety of factors. As Lord Mance
explained in Jones:
[A] proportionate approach in pursuit of a legitimate aim is, by
definition, not the same as an approach requiring all states either to
assume universal civil jurisdiction or (in the case of countries like
England) to forgo all discretionary qualifications on the breadth of their
3 79
technical jurisdictional rules.

Lord Mance stated that courts deciding whether to here a claim
for torture still must
consider and balance all relevant factors, including any evidence before
it as to the availability or otherwise of an effective remedy for the
torture in the state responsible for it. This exercise would have to be
undertaken at the same time as considering any other jurisdictional

472, 459, and Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 545, with Doe v. Unocal,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
377.
See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board), (1993] 1 S.C.R. 897,
38-39.
378.
The Ontario Court of Appeals noted in Bouzari, for example, that "if
Ontario does not take jurisdiction, the appellant will be left without a place to sue."
[2004] 71 O.R.3d 675, 37.
379.
Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2005] Q.B. 699 92 (U.K.
Ct. App.).
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issues which arise (including thereby issues of discretion and forum non
380
conveniens).

This analysis applies readily to the Canadian context as well.
Legislation would help clarify the factors to be considered in
determining whether a Canadian court should proceed with a given
case, but ultimately it does not remove the need inherent in all civil
litigation for courts to examine the overall context. Doctrines, such as
the "real and substantial connection" test for personal jurisdiction,
forum non conveniens, exhaustion, and a thorough investigation of
international law must guide courts in determining whether a tort
case for violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law should proceed.

V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, provincial tort legislation making explicit Canada's
commitment to promoting human rights and the international rule of
law via transnational public law litigation is needed. If Canada
wishes to safeguard its role and its reputation as proponent of
international law and protector of human rights, it must keep in
mind "the extent to which adjudication in a domestic court effectively
promotes the core value of accountability," which "is central to the
idea of the 'rule of law."' 38 ' The difficulty of balancing the often
competing agendas of multilateralism, rule of law, and human rights
is not unique to Canada. As Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal noted in the Arrest Warrant case,
[o]ne of the challenges of present-day international law is to provide for
stability of international relations and effective international
intercourse while at the same time guaranteeing respect for human
rights. The difficult task that international law faces today is to provide
the impunity
stability in international relations by a means other than
382
of those responsible for major human rights violations.

Canadian tort legislation for gross violations of human right and
humanitarian law that is firmly grounded in international law is a
step in the right direction.

380.
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382.
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Chibundu, supra note 33, at 1074.
Arrest Warrant, supra note 269, 5.

